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SCHOLARLY OPINIONS
PRESIDENTIAL UNDECLARED WARMAKING AND FUNCTION-
ALIST THEORY: DELLUMS V. BUSH AND OPERATIONS
DESERT SHIELD AND DESERT STORM
GEORGE STEVEN SWAN*
You cannot handle an armed nation if it is democratic,
because democracies do not go to war that way. You have
got to have a concentrated, militaristic organization of
government to run a nation of that sort. You have got to
think of the President of the United States, not as the chief
counsellor of the nation, elected for a little while, but as the
man meant constantly and every day to be the commander
in chief of the army and navy of the United States, ready to
order them to any part of the world where the threat of war
is a menace to his own people.
And you cannot do that under free debate.'
[W]ar was an instrument of foreign policy, pure and simple.
President Bush had demonstrated this in Panama. The
administration had not gone out and taken a vote or
attempted to drum up support. Instead, Bush had used his
authority as commander-in-chief of the armed forces. The
public and congressional support had then followed.2
I. INTRODUCTION
The following briefly delineates the 1990-1991 military crisis whereby
Kuwait was invaded and occupied by Iraq, and thereafter liberated by an
* Associate Professor, School of Business and Economics, N.C. A&T State U.,
Greensboro. S.J.D. and LL.M., U. of Toronto; J.D., University of Notre Dame.
1. W. Wilson, An Address in the St. Louis Coliseum (Sept. 5, 1919) in 64 THE PAPERS
OF WOODROW WILSON 43, 46 (A. Link ed. 1990).
2. B. WOODWARD, THE COMMANDERS 230 (1991) (reflections of National Security
Council Director Brent Scowcroft). Said some of President Bush's advisors on August 1
1990, of exercising American military muscle in the Persian Gulf:
"It'll be easier to get the U.N. to agree than Congress." And one of them added, "It's
true we've promised to consult Congress if there's a war. In other words, we'll phone
them just after the first bombs have been dropped."
P. SALINGER & E. LAURENT, SECRET DOSSIER: THE HIDDEN AGENDA BEHIND THE GULF WAR
176 (H. Curtis trans. 1991). Pierre Salinger is a former U.S. Senator from California.
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international force authorized by the Security Council of the United Nations.
It will be seen that, in general, Security Council resolutions were enforced
energetically by President George Bush consistently with the Charter of the
United Nations. That American commitment was not mandatory under the
United Nations Charter and the United Nations Participation Act. However,
the American military endeavor at the President's behest was constitutional,
at least as it erupted into Operation Desert Storm shortly after passage of the
Congress' January 12, 1991, Authorization for Use of Military Force against
Iraq Resolution. When U.S. Representative Ronald Dellums and his
colleagues from both houses of Congress had turned to the federal judiciary
in late 1990 to forestall war without Congressional consent, they were
rebuffed.
The instant discussion comprehends the modern, federal interbranch
division of labor-wherein a bifurcated presidency makes foreign policy
independently, while sharing domestic policymaking with a Congress
concentrating upon economic policies3-rather in terms of political econo-
my.' It analyzes the Presidential and Congressional response to the crisis
of 1990-1991 from the social science perspective of functionalism, which
3. Swan, 7he Political Economy of Presidential Foreign Policymaking: The
Contemporary Theory of a Bifurcated Presidency, 21 CALIF. W. INT'L L.J. 67, 68-69 (1990).
4. "[A] good case can be made for the proposition that, as suggested by the older term
'political economy,' the very purpose of economics is to predict the economic consequences of
political decisions." D. USHER, THE ECONOMIC PREREQUISITE TO DEMOCRACY 3 (1981).
5. M. GLENNON, CONSiTUTIONAL DIPLOMACY, xx (1990). Since the instant discussion
draws upon the fine work of Prof. Glennon, it must be acknowledged that, like all mortals, he
is fallible; he refers to "the requirement that the Chief Executive give a State-of-the Union ad-
dress." Id. at 50. But the Constitution actually requires of the President: "He shall from time
to time give to the Congress Information of the State of the Union.. .. " U.S. CONST. art. II,
§ 3. In fact, President Wilson on April 8, 1913, was the first President since John Adams on
November 22, 1800, to personally address Congress. 3 R. BAKER, WOODROW WILSON: LIFE
AND LETrERS 104 n.4, 105-06 (1946). This address was assailed on separation of powers
grounds as "the speech from the throne." Id. at 105. The Adams and Wilson traditions have
been melded: "President Nixon broke with precedent Jan. 20 [1972] when he delivered two
state-of-the-union messages to Congress-a 4,000 word speech tailored for national television
and a 15,000 word document elaborating on the address." CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY,
NIXON: THE THIRD YEAR OF HIS PRESIDENCY 1 (1972). Glennon's belief that the throne
speech is constitutionally mandated evidences how far even Glennon has embraced the imperial
presidency. A. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY (1973). As even historical
novelist Gore Vidal asserted subsequent to Glennon:
Since 1920 no American president has written his state speeches; lately, many of
our presidents seem to experience some difficulty in reading aloud what others
have written for them to say. But until Woodrow Wilson suffered a stroke, it was
assumed that the chief task of the first magistrate was to report to the American
people, in their Congress assembled, upon the state of the union. The president
was elected not only to execute the laws but to communicate to the people his
vision of the prospect before us.
Vidal, Lincoln Up Close, N.Y. REV. BOOKS 21 (Aug. 15, 1991).
2
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 22, No. 1 [1991], Art. 4
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol22/iss1/4
1991] PRESIDENTIAL UNDECLARED WARMAKING AND FUNCTIONALIST THEORY 77
premises social organization along classifications determined by perfor-
mance.6  This approach as invoked here is not supposed to be normative7
or prescriptive.8 In constitutional debate that is normative or prescriptive,
functionalist argument would be of no more than subsidiary value: it would
fall behind initial dependence upon the constitutional text, the case law, and
the synthesis of custom with the Framers' intent by assigning weight to those
practices dating back to the days when the Framers managed the nation."
II. THE CRISIS OF 1990-1991
On July 25, 1990, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein"° summoned U.S.
Ambassador April Glaspie for the final, pre-invasion high-level contact 1
between the two governments.12 The transcript of their meeting on that date
as released by Baghdad 3 includes Ambassador Glaspie's face to face
assurance to Saddam Hussein: "I have a direct instruction from the president
6. DICTIONARY OF SOCIOLOGY 126 (H. Fairchild ed. 1967). Cf. 3 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF PHILOSOPHY 256 (P. Edwards ed. 1967); THE HARPER DICTIONARY OF MODERN THOUGHT
250 (A. Bullock & 0. Stallybrass eds. 1977); and J. ZADROZNY, DICTIONARY OF SOCIAL
SCIENCE 129 (1959).
7. "Rivkin and Block are correct as to the law in their articulation of the contemporary
theory of a bifurcated presidency, at least insofar as the Constitutional law is defined
descriptively and predictively." Swan, supra note 3, at 101. "However, Rivkin and Block may
be seriously incorrect as to the law insofar as the constitutional law is defined either normatively
or explanatorily." Id. at 102.
8. As Glennon frames the matter from a somewhat different perspective: "[O]ne cannot
normally argue for a given allocation of powers on the basis of functional considerations, for
a simple reason: The Constitution has already taken those considerations into account." M.
GLENNON, supra note 5, at 47. "There appears to be no case in which the approach was solely
relied upon by the [Supreme] Court, and indeed even passing references to functional consider-
ations are fairly rare." Id. at 42.
9. Id. at 51-52 & 68-69.
10. President Saddam Hussein remained a focus of controversy personally throughout the
1990-1992 crisis beyond the degree indicated by a legal analysis such as this one.
11. The true substance of this July 25, 1990, interview remained in dispute in 1991. U.S.
Judge Charles Richey then ordered the State Department to surrender classified records of the
Glaspie interview with Hussein. U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Sept. 9, 1991, at 16. This
much is certain:
Ambassador returned to her theme, recalling that the President had instructed her
to broaden and deepen our relations with Iraq. Saddam had referred to some
circles' antipathetic to that aim. Such circles certainly existed, but U.S.
Administration is instructed by the President. On the other hand, the President
does not control the American press; if he did, criticism of the administration
would not exist.
Cablegram from Ambassador Glaspie to Secretary Baker, July 23, 1990, quoted in Draper,
Presidential Wars, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Sept. 26, 1991, at 64, 72, col. 3.
12. "Never before had any ambassador been called for a private audience with the
dictator." Blumenthal, April's Bluff, NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 5, 1991, at 8.
13. "In early February 1991 the Iraqi government released what it said was the transcript
of the meeting." P. SALINGER & E. LAURENT, supra note 2, at 212.
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to seek better relations with Iraq." 4 She soon elaborated upon her direction
from President Bush with one from Secretary of State James A. Baker, III:
I have lived here for years. I admire your extraordinary efforts
to rebuild your country. I know you need funds. We understand
that and our opinion is that you should have the opportunity to
rebuild your country. But we have no opinion on the Arab-Arab
conflicts, like your border disagreement with Kuwait.
I was in the American embassy in Kuwait during the late '60s.
The instruction we had during this period was that we should
express no opinion on this issue and that the issue is not associated
with America. James Baker has directed our official spokesmen
to emphasize this instruction. We hope you can solve this
problem using any suitable methods via Klibi or via President
Mubarak. All that we hope is that these issues are solved quickly.
15
Of course, her auditor did plan to solve the Kuwait border issue quickly.
At almost the same time State Department spokeswoman Margaret Tutwiler
told reporters: "We do not have any defence treaties with Kuwait, and there
are no defence or special security commitments to Kuwait."16 On July 31,
1990, Under Secretary of State John Kelly testified before the Middle East
Subcommittee of the House of Representatives. 7 Kelly shared this
exchange with Representative Lee Hamilton:
"Defense Secretary Richard Cheney has been quoted in the
press as saying that the United States was committed to going to
the defense of Kuwait if she were attacked. Is that exactly what
was said? Could Mr. Kelly clarify this?"
"I don't know the quotation to which you refer, but I have
confidence in the administration's position on this matter. We
don't have any defense treaty with the Gulf states. That's clear.
We support the independence and security of all friendly states in
the region.
Since the Truman administration, we've maintained naval
forces in the area because its stability is in our interest. We call
for a peaceful solution to all disputes and we think that the
sovereignty of every state in the Gulf must be respected."
"If, for example, Iraq crossed the Kuwaiti border, for whatever
14. The Glaspie Transcript: Saddam Meets the U.S. Ambassador, in THE GULF READER:
HISTORY, DOCUMENTS, OPINIONS 122, 128 (M. Sifry and C. Cerf eds. 1991).
15. Id. at 130.
16. A. DARWISH & G. ALEXANDER, UNHOLY BABYLON: THE SECRET HISTORY OF
SADDAM's WAR 266 (1991).
17. P. SALINGER & LAURENT, supra note 2, at 68.
[Vol. 22
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reason, what would our position be regarding the use of American
forces?"
"That's the kind of hypothetical question I cannot enter into.
Suffice it to say that we would be extremely concerned, but I
cannot venture into the realms of hypothesis."
"If such a thing should happen, though, is it correct to say that
we have no treaty, no commitment, which would oblige us to use
American forces?"
"That's exactly right."'
The Kuwaiti rulers thought, with some reason, that the Iraqi threat would
not wax unrestrained. Never before in the Arab nation's recent history had
one country invaded another:19 Saddam's blitzkrieg invasion of their
land' would be the first.2' (To be sure, during the Suez crisis it had been
Iraq-then ruled by a royal family-which had permitted Britain to use air
facilities to attack Egypt with fighter planes. 2) In fact, Kuwait on August
2, 1990, was the first entire, independent country since 1945 to be murdered
outright, i.e., invaded to be erased from the map'I (unlike Hungary, 1956;
18. Id. at 68-69.
19. Id. at 32.
20. J. MILLER & L. MYLROIE, SADDAM HUSSEIN AND THE CRISIS IN THE GULF xiv
(1990).
21. R. PYLE, SCHWARTZKOPF: THE MAN, THE MISSION, THE TRIUMPH 83 (1991). Abba
Eban, Israel's foreign minister during 1967, offered the label "policide" for destroying a state's
independence, as distinguished from seizing land or installing a satellite regime. M. WALZER,
JUST AND UNJUST WARS: A MORAL ARGUMENT WITH HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS 52 (1977)
("policide"). "The future of Israel remains uncertain in the face of the continuing ultimate Arab
goal of politicide if not genocide." A. DERSHOWITZ, CHUTZPAH 248 (1991) ("politicide").
22. S. SALINGER & E. LAURENT, supra note 2, at 220.
23. J. MILLER & L. MYLROIE, supra note 20, at 219.
[S]tates generally restrict their use of armed force to intervention in civil war and
to security issues. In relatively few instances, for example, have states sought to
take control of territory through armed force: China in Tibet, Iraq in Iran, Arab
states in Israel, Argentina in the Falklands, Indonesia in East Timor, India in Goa,
Pakistan in Kashmir, and Iraq in Kuwait. Half of these attempts have failed.
O'Connell, Enforcing the Prohibition on the Use of Force: The U.N. 's Response to Iraq's
Invasion of Kuwait, 15 So. ILL. U.L.J. 453, 462 (1991).
Interestingly, in all these cases the attacking state had some colorable legal claim
to the territory in question. No cases since the U.N. Charter exist of a state
attempting to annex territory by force to which it had no claim, even though as late
as the 1940's this was obviously an activity which states thought they could engage
in with impunity.
Id. at 462 n.53.
Most major fighting occurring today, including the fighting in Ethiopia, Angola,
Sri Lanka, Lebanon, Liberia, El Salvador and Mozambique are all civil wars.
Only the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia do not
qualify as civil wars.
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the Dominican Republic, 1965; Czechoslovakia, 1968; Bangladesh, 1971;
Uganda, 1979; Afghanistan, 1979; Grenada, 1983; or Panama, 1989).
On August 7, 1990, President Bush sent the first American troops to
defend Kuwait's neighbor, Saudi Arabia. On August 8, 1990, he told the
American people from the Oval Office: "First, we seek the immediate,
unconditional and complete withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait."'
He added:
I want to be clear about what we are doing and why. America
does not seek conflict, nor do we seek to chart the destiny of other
nations. But America will stand by her friends. The mission of
our troops is wholly defensive. Hopefully, they will not be
needed long. They will not initiate hostilities, but they will
defend themselves, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and other
friends in the Persian Gulf.'
By August 9, 1990, this defensive effort had been dubbed Operation Desert
Shield.2 '
Not only had the U.S. no mutual security treaty with Kuwait, but the U.S.
had none with any of the other Gulf states. Therefore, the commitment to
intervene in the Gulf region represented no more than a sole executive agree-
ment.' Given the presidential authority as commander in chief,' and the
presidential authority to recognize foreign governments and receive foreign
ambassadors," he doubtless enjoys the capacity to enter some sole executive
agreements;" the scope of his power to conclude international agreements
without the Senate's consent remains undefined.31  Sole executive
agreements, arrived at without reference to either treaty or congressional
enactment, validly may deal with any matter which constitutionally falls
under the president's independent powers. 2 This Gulf commitment was
actually more inclusive than is any of the seven mutual security treaties to
which America is party, because none of those includes an ironclad guarantee
that America will go to war.
Id. at 463.
24. Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Aug. 13, 1990, at 1216-17.
25. Id. at 1218.
26. B. WOODWARD, supra note 2, at 279.
27. Glennon, The Gulf War and the Constitution, 70 FoREIGN AFFAIRS 84, 85 (Nov. 2,
1991). "[E]xecutive agreements have not been used for mutual-security undertakings." M.
GLENNON, supra note 5, at 35.
28. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
29. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
30. Swan, The 1962 Cuban Missile Agreement: Status and Prospects upon Its Second
Quarter-Century, 11 HASTINGS INT'L AND & COMP. L. REV. 391, 394 (1988).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 395.
[Vol. 22
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For example, the late Secretary of State Dean Gooderham Acheson, who
executed3 the treaty of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization for the
United States, recalled for his memoirs35 that Article 5 of that treaty merely
calls for each signatory nation to respond to attack upon the N.A.T.O.
alliance with such action as it chose, "including the use of armed force."'
That treaty does not require an automatic, defensive American war bypassing
Congressional deliberation.3" Article 11 declares that "This Treaty shall be
ratified and its provisions carried out by the Parties in accordance with their
respective constitutional processes." 38 (Close reading of this chapter shows
that the subtle Acheson never actually denies that the President as
commander in chief can enter a N.A.T.O. war on his own., Acheson even
relates: "I believe it to be true that Congress has never 'declared war.'
Beginning with the Declaration of Independence, it has found that some
foreign power has made war on the United States and that a state of war
exists with that power."')
On January 12, 1991, the Senate by a vote of 52 to 47 joined the House
of Representatives of the 102nd Congress in passing the Authorization for
Use of Military Force against Iraq Resolution.4 It was keyed to both the
United Nations Security Council's resolutions and the War Powers Resolu-
tion.42 This January 12 Resolution in provided:
(a) AUTHORIZATION.-The President is authorized, subject to
33. D. ACHESON, PRESENT AT THE CREATION: MY YEARS IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT
284 (1969).
34. North Atlantic Treaty, April 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, T.1.A.S. No. 1964, 34 U.N.T.S.
243 [hereinafter NATO].
35. D. ACHESON, supra note 33, at 280-81.
36.
The Parties agreed that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or
North America shall be considered an attack against them all; and consequently
they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the
right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the
Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking
forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it
deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the
security of the North Atlantic area.
Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall
immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be
terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore
and maintain international peace and security.
NATO, supra note 34, art. 5.
37. "Similar to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's Charter, the U.N. Charter was
never intended to displace the U.S. constitutional process." E. KEYNES, UNDECLARED WAR:
TWIUGHT ZONE OF CONSTITUTIONAL POWER xvi (1991).
38. NATO, supra note 34, art. 11.
39. D. ACHESON, supra note 33, at 280-83.
40. Id. at 749 n.
41. S.J. Res. 2, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., Cong. Rec. S. 403 (daily ed. Jan. 12, 1991).
42. 50 U.S.C. § 1547 (1973).
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subsection (b) to use United States Armed Forces pursuant to
United Nations Security Council Resolution 678 (1990) in order
to achieve implementation of Security Council Resolutions 660,
661, 662, 664, 665, 666, 667, 669, 670, 674, and 677.
(b) REQUIREMENT FOR DETERMINATION THAT USE OF
MILITARY FORCE IS NECESSARY.-Before exercising the
authority granted in subsection (a), the President shall make
available to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the
President pro tempore of the Senate his determination that-
(1) the United States has used all appropriate diplomatic and
other peaceful means to obtain compliance by Iraq with the United
National Security Council resolutions cited in subsection (a); and
(2) those efforts have not been and would not be successful in
obtaining such compliance.
(c) WAR POWERS RESOLUTION REQUIREMENTS.-
(1) SPECIFIC STATUTORY AUTHORIZATION.-Consistent with
section 6(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution, the Congress
declares that this section is intended to constitute specific statutory
authorization within the meaning of section 5(b) of the War
Powers Resolution.
(2) APPLICABILITY OF OTHER REQUIREMENTS.-Nothing in this
resolution supersedes any requirement of the War Powers
Resolution.'
On January 16, 1991, allied aerial attacks upon the Iraqis opened the
American-led United Nations-authorized offensive to free Kuwait; the U.S.
offensive role changed the name of the Operation from Desert Shield to
Desert Storm." Weeks of aerial pounding preceded a ground offensive
freeing Kuwait in what President Bush styled "the hundred hour war. " '
Those four days of land warfare preceded a unilateral, provisional cease fire
43. S. J. Res. 2, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., Cong. Rec. at S. 403 - S. 404 (daily ed. Jan. 12,
1991); 30 I.L.M. 296 (1991).
44. B. WOODWARD, supra note 2, at 352.
In response to Iraq, the weakness in enforcement has been overcome, and the U.N.
has acted dramatically. It has adopted sweeping, comprehensive enforcement
measures culminating in Desert Storm. Desert Storm seems to be what
conventional thinking in international law has wanted in terms of enforcement:
force authorized by the United Nations to counter aggression. Desert Storm is the
answer to critics of the law. Nevertheless, international lawyers should now
question whether it is the sort of enforcement the nations of the world really want.
O'Connell, supra note 23, at 456.
45. R. PYLE, supra note 21, at 148.
[Vol. 22
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on February 28, 1991.'
Security Council Resolution 687 of April 3, 1991, offered to close the
conflict and progressively to lift most sanctions against Iraq were Baghdad
to bow to a stringent series of military and financial conditions.47
Resolution 687 not only demanded that Iraq respect the Kuwait border as
inviolable, but decided Baghdad must embrace its chemical and biological
disarmament, and its disarmament of all ballistic missiles of a range beyond
150 kilometers. The Security Council held Iraq must unconditionally abjure
nuclear weapons, and reaffirmed Iraq's financial liability for damages
resulting from the Iraqis' unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait. It
added that upon Baghdad's accession to the stringencies of Resolution 687
the embargo announced in Resolution 661 would be dissolved. While
deciding to remain seized of the matter generally, the Security Council
declared that a formal ceasefire between Iraq and Kuwait and the nations
reinforcing Kuwait in accordance with Resolution 678 would take effect upon
official notice by Baghdad to the Security Council of Iraq's acceptance of the
terms of Resolution 687."
On April 6, 1991, Baghdad acceded to these United Nations terms. Iraqi
representative at the United Nations Abdul Amir al-Anbari delivered the Iraqi
acceptance to the offices of the United Nations Secretary General and the
chair of the Security Council. That representative then publicly announced
that he considered Resolution 687 "one-sided and unfair."49 The Iraqi
acceptance, automatically imposing a permanent ceasefire, ° brought the war
to a close, leaving the United States without a United Nations justification for
a heavy American military presence.
It has been seen that the January 12, 1991, Authorization for Use of
Military Force against Iraq Resolution was geared to U.N. Security Council
resolutions. It was Baghdad's accession to Security Council Resolution 687
which ended the conflict. Therefore, a closer look at the 1990 resolutions
of the Security Council is undertaken in Section III. A more detailed
examination of the presidential response to these resolutions is presented in
Section IV.
III. THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL
Security Council Resolution 660 of August 2, 1990, determined there to be
a breach of international peace and security respecting the overrunning of
Kuwait. It condemned the Iraqi invasion, and demanded an immediate and
46. P. SAHNGER & E. LAURENT, supra note 2, at 219.
47. Lewis, U.N. Votes Stem Conditions for Formally Ending War; Iraqi Response
Uncertain, N.Y. Times, Apr. 4, 1991, at 1, col. 6.
48. SCOR Rcs. 687 (1991), reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 847.
49. Cowell, Baghdad Formally Agrees to 'Unjust' U.N. Conditions for Permanent
Cease-Fire: Truce Is Official, N.Y. Times, Apr. 7, 1991, at 1, col. 6.
50. Id.
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unconditional Iraqi withdrawal of all of Baghdad's forces to their August 1,
1990, positions. The vote was 14 to 0, Yemen alone abstaining."
Resolution 661 of August 6, 1990, affirmed, in accordance with Article 51
of the U.N. Charter, 2 the inherent right of individual or collective
self-defense regarding Iraq's attack upon Kuwait. Nothing was to impede
assistance to the legitimate government of Kuwait, which the Security
Council found to have been usurped. Resolution 661 slapped an embargo
against exports from Iraq and Kuwait, foreclosed the sale of nonmedical,
nonhumanitarian commodities or products to Iraq and Kuwait, and called for
a financial blockade of Iraq and Kuwait. This vote was 13 to 0, Yemen and
Cuba abstaining. 3
The Security Council Resolution 662 of August 9, 1990, was a reaction to
Iraq's announced comprehensive and eternal merger with Kuwait. The
Security Council decided the absorption of Kuwait by Iraq, under whatever
form or pretext, to be devoid of legal validity, and a nullity. It determined
to restore Kuwait's sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity. The
51. SCOR Res. 660 (1990), reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1325. "The 1990 condemnation of
Iraq by the Security Council for its naked aggression against Kuwait was the first time in recent
memory that the United Nations had condemned Arab aggression." A. DERSHOWITZ, supra note
21, at 224.
52. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
On August 6, 1990, the U.N. Security Council intervened decisively in the
growing crisis by approving Resolution No. 661, requiring member states to
impose a variety of sanctions against Iraq, short of the use of armed force, under
Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. Significantly, this resolution also explicitly
"[a]ffirm[ed] the inherent right of individual and collective self-defense, in
response to the armed attack by Iraq against Kuwait, in accordance with Article 51
of the Charter."
Malloy, The Iraqi Sanctions: Something Old, Something New, 15 So. ILL. U.L.J. 413, 422-23
(1991).
53. SCOR Res. 661 (1990), reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1325.
Various terms have been used to describe the naval operations in support of this
Resolution. It would seem inappropriate to use "blockade," a term carrying with
it connotations of a state of war and the implication of the right of a neutral to
trade to some extend on grounds of equality with the belligerents and which is not
sufficiently wide to cover the full extent of the limitation on trading relations with
Iraq demanded by Resolution 661. Also, it is not the intention that carriers of
contraband should be subject to the usual sanctions for their unneutral service of
forfeiture of the goods or the ships. The American term "interdiction" is not a
term of art. Reliance upon it has probably been prompted as much by domestic
constitutional considerations--it could be presented as less than or different from
an act of war--as by ones of international law. It became less accurate as a
description when it became necessary to extend the authorization of States to take
measures from ships to aircraft suspected of violating Resolution 661. The
measures envisaged here were principally refusal of permission to take off from
or over-fly a State's territory for flights bound to Iraq or Kuwait. It was
specifically provided that any such measures be consistent with international law,
which substantially restricts the right to use force against commercial aeroplanes.
Warbrick, The Invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, 40 INT'L & COMI'. L.Q. 482, 485-86 (1991).
10
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vote therefor was unanimous.'
Resolution 664 of August 18, 1990, unanimously reaffirmed Resolution
662, and demanded that Baghdad permit the departure of third country
nationals from Iraq and Kuwait.55 Resolution 665 of August 25, 1990,
summoned the governments cooperating with Kuwait against Iraq to halt
shipping so as to implement Resolution 661. Head of the U.S. delegation at
the U.N. Thomas Pickering received orders from Secretary of State Baker
to keep the fifteen members of the Security Council in session for as long as
needed to pass Resolution 665.1 This very serious vote taken at 4:00 a.m.
was 13 to 0, Yemen and Cuba abstaining.57 Resolution 666 of September
13, 1990, recognized that circumstances might arise where it would be
necessary to supply food to the civilians in Iraq or Kuwait, and recalled that
Resolution 661 did not apply to supplies strictly intended for medical
purposes. This vote also was 13 to 0, Yemen and Cuba again abstaining."
The unanimously supported Resolution 667 of September 16, 1990,
expressed outrage at Iraq's violations of diplomatic premises inside Kuwait,
and at the abduction of personnel with diplomatic immunity, and at the
abduction of foreign nationals within the violated diplomatic premises. It
demanded the release at once of those foreign nationals, as well as those
encompassed by Resolution 664.-" (As it happened, all hostages were
released by the close of 1990.1) The unanimously adopted Security Council
Resolution 66961 of September 24, 1990, and Resolution 670 of September
25, 1990, between them reviewed the Resolution 661 embargo and tightened
the air cargo embargo. Resolution 670 also called upon all states to detain
any Iraqi registry-ships entering their ports being, or previously having been,
used in violation of Resolution 661. This vote was 14 to 1, Cuba
opposing.'
Resolution 674 of October 29, 1990, added the condemnation of Iraq's
destruction of Kuwaiti demographic records, forced relocation of Kuwaitis,
and unlawful seizure and destruction of public and private property in
Kuwait. It reminded Baghdad that under international law Iraq is liable to
Kuwait and third states, and to their nationals and corporations, for damages
stemming from the illegal invasion and occupation of Kuwait. The
Resolution 674 vote was 13 to 0, Yemen and Cuba abstaining.'
54. SCOR Res. 662 (1990), reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1327.
55. SCOR Res. 664 (1990), reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1328.
56. S. SALINGER & E. LAURENT, supra note 2, at 180.
57. SCOR Res. 665 (1990), reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1329.
58. SCOR Res. 666 (1990), reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1330.
59.' SCOR Res. 667 (1990), reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1332; Meron, Prisoners of War,
Civilians and Diplomats in the Gulf Crisis, 85 A.J.I.L. 104.
60. S. SALINGER & E. LAURENT, supra note 2, at 204.
61. SCOR Res. 669 (1990), reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1333.
62. SCOR Res. 670 (1990), reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1334.
63. SCOR Res. 674 (1990), reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1561.
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Resolution 677 of November 28 articulated the Security Council's grave
concern at, and condemned, Iraq's ongoing bid to alter the demographic
makeup of the Kuwaiti populace, and to destroy the civil records maintained
by Kuwait's legitimate government. The Security Council unanimously
mandated the Secretary General to assume custody of the Kuwaiti population
register current to August 1, 1990.1
The issue of Iraq's political manipulation of the demography of Kuwait
reached in the unopposed Resolutions 674 and 677 was one properly
addressed.' The noted scholar Alfred Cobban long ago questioned whether
a country may annex a land inhabited by members of another nationality,
remove a great many of them by pressure explicit or implicit-or simply
through their own preference not to live under an alien regime-introduce
in their place its own nationals, and thereupon claim the region on the theory
of self-determination.' The problem in recent times has reemerged in such
diverse locales as Northern Ireland, the Falkland Islands, and New Cale-
donia.67 Only the timely intervention of Operation Desert Storm precluded
agonizing future dilemmas deriving from the Iraqi political manipulation of
demography in Kuwait.
Security Council Resolution 678 of November 29, 1990, demanded Iraq
fully comply with Resolution 660 and all subsequent relevant resolutions. It
authorized (unless Iraq by January 15, 1991, fully complied with all relevant
resolutions) countries cooperating with Kuwait against Iraq to exercise all
necessary force to implement Resolution 660 and to restore peace and
international security to the region. The vote on this crucial initiative was
12 to 2; Yemen and Cuba voted in the negative, while the veto-wielding s
People's Republic of China abstained.'
64. SCOR Res. 677 (1990), reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1564.
65. Swan, Irish Unification as Northern Ireland Self-Determination: A Speculative
Reappraisal of the Evidence, 2 FLA. INT'L L.J. 129, 142-52 (1986).
66. A. COBBAN, THE NATION-STATE AND NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION 72-73 (rev.
ed. 1969).
67. Swan, supra note 65, at 150-52, 152 n. 144.
68.
1. Each member of the Security Council shall have one vote.
2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters shall be made by an
affirmative vote of nine members.
3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an
affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring votes of the permanent
members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VI, and under paragraph 3 of
Article 52, a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting.
U.N. CHARTER art. 27, paras. 1-3. Strict interpretation of Article 27 would demand positive
concurrence of the permanent members, instead of acquiescence via abstention for decision on
issues of substance. However, the Security Council established that abstention by a great power
failed to veto. Swan, Quasi-Constitutional Developments in Northern Ireland: Enduring
Stalemate and Potential Resolution, 13 CALIF. W. INT'L L.J. 378, 402 (1983).
69. SCOR Res. 678 (1990), reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1565.
12
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 22, No. 1 [1991], Art. 4
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol22/iss1/4
1991] PRESIDENTIAL UNDECLARED WARMAIING AND FUNCTIONALIST THEORY 87
IV. PRESIDENTIAL RESPONSE TO SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS
In Saddam Hussein's capture of Kuwait President Bush faced what was
characterized as the gravest global crisis since the 1950 Korean War. 70
Only twice in its history has the U.N. Security Council authorized military
enforcement (i.e., compulsion or coercion) action, as distinguished from
simple peacekeeping or deterrence, 7' and these instances were in the Korean
War and in the Persian Gulf during 1990.1 It was Security Council
Resolution 665 of August 25, 1990, which represented the first time since the
Korean War where the Security Council had endorsed force to resolve an
international crisis.' In both Korea and the Persian Gulf the Security
Council authorized the unleashing of ad hoc forces to restore peace
internationally.74 Security Council Resolution 678 of November 29, 1990,
carried the broadest authorization of war to be granted by the Security
Council since 1950. 75
Resolution 661 of August 6, 1990, hinged on Article 51 of the United
Nations Charter76 allowing force in individual or collective self-defense
"until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain
international peace and security."' Already by August 10, 1990, Secretary
of State Baker claimed Security Council authority to forcibly interfere with
third country trade with Kuwait or Iraq: "[W]e have the legal authority
necessary to institute such an embargo or blockade provided that the request
comes from the legitimate Government of Kuwait." 71 The Emir of Kuwait
scarcely being in any position to withhold such a request, called for it on
August 12.' On August 12, President Bush ordered Navy ships to stop all
vessels carrying Iraqi oil products and all imports into Iraq but for some
70. A. DARWISH & G. ALEXANDER, supra note 16, at xv.
71. Russett & Sutterlin, The U.N. in a New World Order, 70 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 69, 73
(Nov. 2, 1991).
72. Id. at 68.
73. R. PYLE, supra note 21, at 111. "Korea stood alone in United Nations practice until
August 25, 1990." Glennon, The Constitution and Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter,
85 A.J.I.L. 74, 81 (1991).
74. Russett & Sutterlin, supra note 71, at 73. America's Gen. Douglas MacArthur, being
Supreme Commander of the United Nations Forces in Korea, was the first U.N. general and
first leader of a largescale military action ever shouldered by a global organization. R. ROVERE
& A. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE GENERAL AND THE PRESIDENT 223 (1951).
75. B. WOODWARD, supra note 2, at 333.
76. "Affirming the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense, in response to
the armed attack by Iraq against Kuwait, in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter ..
SCOR Res. 661 (1990), reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1325.
77. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
78. Lewis, Security Council's Rare Unity May Be Threatened Over U.S. Warships in the
Gulf, N.Y. Times, Aug. 11, 1990, at A7, col. 3.
79. Crozier, Handling the United Nations, NATIONAL REVIEW, April 1, 1991, at 40, 42.
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foodstuffs, saying he responded to the Emir's request.' This blockade was,
of course, considered an act of war.8"
The British U.N. representative Sir Crispin Tickell told the Council that
London understood the resolution authorization only to extend to naval vessel
monitoring of ship movements in the Gulf and reporting of suspected
embargo violations;' this basically was the stance as well of Canada,
China, Ethiopia, Finland, the Ivory Coast, Malaysia, Romania, Yemen and
Zaire.' By August 13, 1990, the American announcement that U.S. war
vessels were enforcing sanctions largely isolated the U.S. in the Security
Council." Nevertheless, on August 14, 1990, Washington clung to its
80. R. PYLE, supra note 21, at 88. The U.S. since 1945 repeatedly has blockaded foreign
shores without a declaration of war, e.g., Guatemala, 1954, S. AMBROSE, EISENHOWER: THE
PRESIDENT 193-97, 214 (1984), and Cuba, 1962. The latter followed Congress's Joint Resolu-
tion of October 3, 1962. Pub. L. No. 87-733, 59 Stat. 1044 (1962). This Cuba Resolution was
appealed to by President Kennedy as authority, even if it carried no legal effect. F. WORMUTH
& E. FIRMAGE, infra note 81, at 45. Kennedy also declared he had authority as Commander
in Chief to use force to check the Soviet buildup in Cuba. C. LOFGREN, GOVERNMENT FROM
REFLECTION AND CHOICE: CONSTITUTIONAL ESSAYS ON WAR, FOREIGN RELATIONS, AND
FEDERALISM 223 (1986). The U.S. maritime search and seizure policy against Guatemala in
peacetime was contrary to the unambiguous judgment of the Acting Legal Adviser of the
Department of State. B. COOK, THE DECLASSIFIED EISENHOWER: A DIVIDED LEGACY 267-68
(1981).
81. F. WORMUTH & E. FRIMAGE, To CHAIN THE DOG OF WAR: THE WAR POWER OF
CONGRESS IN HISTORY AND LAW 44-46 (1989). Naval War College Oceans Law and Policy
Department of the Center for Naval Warfare Studies Director Richard J. Grunawalt argued:
United Nations Security Council Resolution 661 does not purport to establish a
blockade of Iraq or Kuwait nor does it invoke the belligerent right of "visit and
search." While both of these measures are embraced by the forceful measures
provisions of Article 42 of the United Nations Charter (blockade explicitly, "visit
and search" by implication), the Security Council has not yet directed their
utilization. Instead, the economic sanction of embargo has been applied.
Enforcement of an embargo at sea is not encompassed within either the peacetime
right of "approach and visit" or the belligerent right of "visit and search." The
flexible concept of maritime quarantine best describes the enforcement mechanism
for embargo. Warships of participating states may intercept vessels proceeding to
or from embargoed territory, subject them to boarding and inspection, and, if
offending cargo is found, turn them away from the targeted state or, if outbound,
require them to return to port. Under this procedure, neither the vessel nor its
cargo are normally subject to capture or destruction. However, minimum force
may be exerted by the intercepting warship to enforce compliance. The authority
to use force to compel compliance with an embargo was specifically recognized by
the Security Council in its embargo against Southern Rhodesia in 1966, when it
called upon the British Government "to prevent by the use of force if necessary the
arrival at Beira of vessels reasonably believed to be carrying oil destined for
Rhodesia."
Grunawalt, The Maritime Dimension of Operation Desert Shield, 15 So. ILL. U.L.J. 487, 498-99
(1991), citing SCOR Res. 221 (1966), reprinted in 5 I.L.M. 534. Grunawalt analogizes
summoning a state to impede the imports of its own colonial holding (U.K.-Rhodesia) with
summoning a third party (e.g., the U.S.) to impede second party shipping to a third party (Iraq).
82. Lewis, supra note 78, at cols. 3-4.
83. Id. at col. 4.
84. Lewis, Order for Blockade Largely Isolates U.S. at Security Council, N.Y. Times,
Aug. 14, 1990, at A9, col. 6.
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contention that the U.S. Navy was authorized to enforce an embargo against
Iraq.' On that date representatives of Britain, France, China, and the
Soviet Union (i.e., the other veto-bearing permanent members of the Security
Council) argued prospectively that the Council should authorize a naval
blockade, if at all, only under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter,' Articles
39-51: "Action with Respect to Threats of the Peace, Breaches of the Peace,
and Acts of Aggression."' As it transpired, in the 1990-1991 Kuwait crisis
as in the Korean War, there was no Security Council reference to Chapter
VII as a foundation for mobilization of a U.N. force for military
endeavors."
That day President Bush at his press conference doggedly insisted upon the
American right within Article 51 of the Charter unilaterally to enforce the
Security Council blockade even in the face of the opposition of U.N.
Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar:
Q. Mr. President, I have a two-part question. After successfully
internationalizing opposition to the Iraqi aggression through the
U.N., why did you jump the gun and unilaterally order a
blockade, upsetting other members? And two, is the U.S. policy
against the annexation of captured lands in the Middle East an
across-the-board policy with the U.S.?
The President. Upsetting-I don't think we've upset members on
our policy of interdiction. We are acting within our legal rights.
And I think the world wants to see these chapter [sic: Article] 51
sanctions carried out, and that's the role the United States is trying
to do.
Q. We didn't go through the step-by-step of chapter 7.
The President. Well, we're doing it the way our attorneys and
others around the world recommend. And I think we're doing it
properly, and I hope we're doing it to the degree that all ships
will turn back if they are in contravention of the U.N. action.'
Q. Mr. President, you have ambassadors coming to the State
85. Lewis, U.S. Seeks to Revive Panel That Enforces U.N. Decrees, N.Y. Times, Aug.
15, 1990, at A19, col. 1.
86. Id. at col. 2.
87. U.N. CHARTER ats. 39-5 1.
88. Russett & Sutterlin, supra note 71, at 75.
89. The President's News Conference: August 14, 1990, Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents, Aug. 20, 1990, at 1246.
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Department, presumably to discuss a U.N. multinational
quarantine, or interdiction, whatever word you want. Is it now
the policy of the United States to potentially submit to a joint
U.N. command or reflag U.S. ships under a U.N. command?
The President. That is not the plan right now, but we are talking
to see how we can make this naval presence most effective. What
you've said there is not the policy of the United States.
Q. Well, sir, may I ask: Do you consider in any way-there are
reports out of the U.N. that there is some criticism that you have
acted unilaterally and perhaps outside your legal authority in the
de facto blockade that's going on. Do you consider that you've
had your hand slapped, or do you think-
The President. No, I don't think so at all. And I think we're
acting legally. So, this little meeting that was called by Cuba
yesterday-it doesn't disturb me in the least. I mean, there can
be differences, people can discuss them. But I'm convinced we're
acting properly, and we are determined to continue to act in that
manner.
You see, Perez de Cuellar apparently talked about only the U.N.
through resolutions can decide about a blockade. But he also said
every country has the right to bring up article 51, and the
Secretary-General had nothing to say against it. And we have
good opinions that we are acting properly. And I have no
intention to change at all. I think it's important that others join in
and do their part, which most of them are doing in their
determination to see that commerce does not continue.'
Q. Mr. President, if I could go back to the naval interdiction
effort for a second. The Soviets apparently are proposing some
kind of a joint security council command to control the naval
interdiction effort. Are you pursuing that in any way with the
Soviets? Are you interested in the idea at all?
The President. There was originally a-I think that was raised to
Jim Baker by [Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard] Shevardnadze.
And I don't have any problem talking to the Soviets about that.
I think it would be a very good thing to have an active Soviet
presence to enforce these U.N. resolutions. All I'm saying is that
90. Id. at 1247.
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I don't think it is essential that you have a U.N. flag in order for
countries to carry out their responsibilities. But I'd be somewhat
openminded to talk further along those lines. 1
By August 22, 1990, the question was whether the U.S. Navy, which
already had stopped some Iraqi ships but boarded none, should board them
without further U.N. approval.' On that date Secretary Baker told Foreign
Minister Shevardnadze: "We're under a lot of pressure, especially from the
Pentagon, who want to be able to use force to implement the embargo
without waiting for U.N. backing. " '
Thereafter, the Security Council validated--only in terminology at best
oblique-the use of force.' The predawn Security Council Resolution 665
of August 25, 1990, summoned states cooperating with Kuwait and deploying
"forces in the area to use such measures commensurate to the specific
circumstances as may be necessary.. . to ensure strict implementation of the
provisions"' of Resolution 661. This constituted the only time in the
history of the United Nations that individual countries outside any umbrella
U.N. command were authorized to enforce an international blockade.9
91. Id. at 1250.
92. B. WOODWARD, supra note 2, at 284.
93. P. SAUNGER & E. LAURENT, supra note 2, at 180. Reported Director Grunawat of
the Naval War College:
U.S. naval forces in the Persian Gulf, the Gulf of Oman, and the Red Sea, acting
in concert with the warships of other states operating in those waters, instituted a
maritime quarantine of Iraq and Kuwait. Although fully consistent with the
purpose and intent of Resolution 661, the Bush administration made it clear from
the outset that U.S. actions were premised upon the inherent right of collective
self-defense reflected in Article 51 of the Charter. When, on August 25th, the
Security Council issued Resolution 665, calling upon States "deploying maritime
forces to the area to use such measures commensurate to the specific circumstances
as may be necessary ... to ensure strict implementation of... Resolution 661,"
the legal basis for resort to force by the United States in its maritime quarantine
operation was further strengthened.
Grunawalt, supra note 80, at 496.
94. Russett & Sutterlin, supra note 71, at 74.
95. SCOR Res. 665 (1990), reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1329.
Prior to the adoption of the Security Council Resolution 665 on August 25th,
which authorized States to take unilateral action to enforce the U.N.[-]imposed
embargo against Iraq, a pertinent question was: could a State such as the United
States take unilateral action to enforce an embargo under Article 51 of the Charter
which recognizes "the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence" in
case of an armed attack against a U.N. member?
The conceptual difficulty, of course, is that the Charter limits the freedom to
take action in self-defense "until the Security Council has taken measures necessary
to maintain international peace and security." Because the Council adopted
Resolution 665, the question became moot.
Nanda, The Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait: The U.N. Response, 15 So. ILL. U.L.J. 431, 449 (1991).
96. B. WOODWARD, supra note 2, at 285.
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It has been seen that an extremely expansive American reading of
Resolution 661 underpinned assertive U.S. naval initiatives under Article 51.
A closer look at the enforcement machinery of the United Nations Charter,
and at American duties under that Charter, is therefore appropriate.
V. THE U.S. AND THE U.N. CHARTER
A. The Charter of the United Nations
Article 39 of the U.N. Charter provides:
The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat
to the peace, or act of aggression and shall make
recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in
accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore
international peace and security.'
In turn, those latter two Articles provide:
Article 41
The Security Council may decide what measures not involving
the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its
decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United
Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or
partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air,
postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and
the severance of diplomatic relations."
Article 42
Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for
in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be
inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as
may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and
security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and
other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the
United Nations."
97. U.N. CHARTER art. 39.
98. U.N. CHARTER art. 41.
99. U.N. CHARTER art. 42. According to Thomas M. Franck and Faiza Patel:
The new alternative to traditional wars of self-defense is collective police actions
by the members of the international community. Exceptionally, these could be
implemented by regional organizations. Usually, they would take the form of
18
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Yet as of early August 1990 the Security Council was in no position to
itself shelter Iraq's neighbors from attack. Consequently, the American
undertaking was launched, as indicated by President Bush as quoted in
Section IV, pursuant to Article 51:1°
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs
against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security
Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international
peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise
of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the
Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and
responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to
take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to
maintain or restore international peace and security." 1
Given that the individual or collective self-defense under Article 51, as in
the August 1990 Operation Desert Shield defense of Kuwait, does not
derogate from the responsibility of the Security Council at any time to take
action to restore international security, Articles 46 and 47 remain salient:
Article 46
Plans for the application of armed force shall be made by the
Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff
Committee. 1 2
Article 47
1. There shall be established a Military Staff Committee to advise
and assist the Security Council on all questions relating to the
Security Council's military requirements for the maintenance of
international peace and security, the employment and command of
global action. Either way, the police. action must be authorized specifically by the
Security Council undir Article 53 (for regional action). or Article 42 (for global
action).
If states use armed force under the self-defense rubic of Article 51, their
individual activities are subsumed by, or incorporated into, the global policy
response once it is activated. That is, the old way is licensed only until the new
way begins to work: "until," in the words of Article 51, "the Security Council
has taken the necessary measures to maintain international peace and security."
Franck & Patel, UN Police Action in Lieu of War: "The Old Order Changeth," 85 A.J.I.L. 63
(1991).
100. Urquhart, Learning from the Gulf, N.Y. REv. BOOKS, Mar. 7, 1991, at 34, col. 3.
101. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
102. U.N. CHARTER art. 46.
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forces placed at its disposal, the regulation of armaments, and
possible disarmament.
2. The Military Staff Committee shall consist of the Chiefs of
Staff of the permanent members of the Security Council or their
representatives. Any Member of the United Nations not
permanently represented on the Committee shall be invited by the
Committee to be associated with it when the efficient discharge
of the committee's responsibilities requires the participation of that
Member in its work.
3. The Military Staff Committee shall be responsible under the
Security Council for the strategic direction of any armed forces
placed at the disposal of the Security Council. Questions relating
to the command of such forces shall be worked out subsequently.
4. The Military Staff Committee, with the authorization of the
Security Council and after consultation with appropriate regional
agencies, may establish regional subcommittees. 1"
What, in the event, proved to be the effective status of the Security Council's
Military Staff Committee?
Security Council Resolution 661 of August 5 decided that all states should
prevent "The import into their territories of all commodities and products
originating in Iraq or Kuwait exported therefrom after the date of the present
resolution; .... ."11 And Security Council Resolution 665 of August 25
called upon those
Member States cooperating with the Government of Kuwait which
are deploying maritime forces to the area to use such measures
commensurate to the specific circumstance as may be necessary
under the authority of the Security Council to halt all inward and
outward maritime shipping in order to inspect and verify their
cargoes and destinations and to ensure strict implementation of the
provisions related to such shipping laid down in resolution 661
(1990): .... 1o
And, of course, Security Council Resolution 6781" of November 29,
103. U.N. CHARTER art. 47.
104. SCOR Res. 661 (1990), reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1325.
105. SCOR Res. 665 (1990), reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1329.
106. SCOR Res. 678 (1990), reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1565.
[The opaque language of the Resolution was understood by the British government
to include the use of armed force and, once again, that force was seen as an aspect
20
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1990, harkened back to Security Council Resolution 660"07 of August 2,
1990, which demanded Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait. It did so when
Resolution 678 authorized ("Authorizes") "all necessary means" to "restore
international peace and security in the area.""" This was extremely vague;
Westerners claimed it justified going beyond liberating Kuwait to invade
Iraq,'" and American officials privately maintained it included destroying
the Iraqi war machine."' 0 They did so notwithstanding that not a single
one of the twelve relevant Security Council resolutions had extended beyond
the rescue of Kuwait.
No provision for Military Staff Committee control of the Security Council's
replies to aggression ever was made.' The notion that land or sea forces
in the Persian Gulf ought to fall under a Security Council Military Staff
Committee was, seemingly, disregarded as unrealistic by the major
participants in the military force amassed in Saudi Arabia." 2  Those
national actors seem never to have weighed the chance that the Security
Council ought, under Article 47.3, to arrange for the command of the forces
in the Persian Gulf.1 3  Instead, Resolution 678 by authorizing "all
necessary means to uphold and implement Security Council Resolution 660
(1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions "114 merely wedded its series
of collective self-defence, to be undertaken at the request of Kuwait, rather than
collective measures directed by the Security Council.
Warbrick, supra note 53, at 486-87.
107. SCOR Res. 660 (1990), reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1325.
108. SCOR Res. 678 (1990), reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1565.
The Council authorized force only to liberate Kuwait. The words of the resolution
limited action to enforcing prior resolutions, in particular, the one calling on Iraq
to withdraw from Kuwait. The coalition used massive force directly against Iraq
to accomplish this goal. Some reports suggested that the coalition was aimed at
crippling Iraq's military capacity, which would have gone beyond the coalition's
authorization. It appears, however, that Desert Storm conformed with the
Council's resolutions.
O'Connell, supra note 23, at 479-80.
109. P. SAUNGER & E. LAURENT, supra note 2, at 199.
110. Massing, The Way to War, N.Y. REv. BOOKS, Mar. 28, 1991, at 17, 22, col. 2.
111. Urquhart, supra note 100, at 34, col. 3.
112. Id. at 34, col. 4-35, col. 1.
113. Id. at 35, col. 1.
The establishment of the Military Staff Committee (MSC) is mandated under the
U.N. Charter "to advise and assist the Security Council on all questions relating
to the Security Council's military requirements for the maintenance of international
peace and security, the employment and command of forces placed at its disposal,
the regulation of armaments, and possible disarmament." The MSC was revived
during the Gulf crisis but its role has been rather limited since the Security
Council's decision was not to take action under Article 42.
Nanda, supra note 95, at 449.
114. SCOR Res. 678 (1990), reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1565.
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of resolutions to the forces collected in Saudi Arabia in the name of Article
51. 115
B. The United Nations Participation Act
Article 25 of the U.N. Charter provides: "The Members of the United
Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council
in accordance with the present Charter.""1 6 Remembering always that
under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution all treaties, including
the U.N. Charter, 17 which are made under the authority of the United
States are the supreme law of the land, 18 was the United States with its
peacekeeping reserves legally bound to go to war (even without a 1991
congressional authorization) to enforce Resolution 678, or would it so have
been bound had that Resolution been mandatory and not permissive?1 9
(By its own terms Resolution 678 lacked binding force because it validated
or authorized but did not require member states' provision of military
115. Urquhart, supra note 100, at 35, col. 1.
While it has sometimes been suggested that the UN collective security system has
functioned in the present crisis in the way anticipated in the Charter, this is not,
in fact, the case. The Security Council is not in a position to require States to
provide forces to take the forcible action envisaged by Article 42 nor has it even
called on States to contribute forces to a UN Force to take military action.
Instead, it has authorised "those Member States co-operating with the Government
of Kuwait" to take action.
Furthermore, Resolution 661 specifically affirmed the right of individual and
collective self-defence.
Warbrick, supra note 53, at 487.
116. U.N. CHARTER art. 25.
117. "[Slome treaties that lack termination clauses may not be terminable.... The United
Nations Charter has been said to represent such a treaty." M. GLENNON, supra note 5, at 158.
"The view of the Charter as an organic treaty to be interpreted with a view to facilitating the
expanding functions of the Organization was first expressed in Certain Expenses of the United
Nations, 1962 I.C.J. Rep. 151 (Advisory Opinion of July 20)." Franck & Patel, supra note 99,
at67 n.17.
118. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. Thomas M. Franck & Faiza Patel argue:
The text and practice are clear. When the President commits U.S. forces to a UN
police action in accordance with Article 42 of the Charter, it is because the U.S.
Government is obliged by international law to comply. Such compliance by the
President with international law is not prohibited-indeed, it is required-by the
Constitution.
Franck & Patel, supra note 99, at 72. Their paper is silent as to the duty of the globe's other
nations (e.g., Japan or the People's Republic of China, another Security Council permanent
member) to march to the front when mustered.
119. The United Nations Participation Act of 1945 unsettled one analyst: "The nice
question arises: Are the 400,000 soldiers we have in Saudi Arabia a part of the peacekeeping
reserves of the United Nations?" Buckley, The Constitutional Question, NATIONAL REVIEW,
Jan. 28, 1991, at 70.
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assistance."2 ) After all, the framers of the U.N. had hoped it to have
permanently on call land, sea and air forces for immediate deployment in
crisis situations, as U.S. Senator Daniel P. Moynihan recollected immediately
prior to Operation Desert Shield. Such an arrangement lay at the heart of
President Franklin D. Roosevelt's concept of a world organization. 121
There was no such duty.
The United Nations Participation Act of 19451 ' is the U.N. Charter's
implementing legislation in the United States." It provides:
The President is authorized to negotiate a special agreement or
agreements with the Security Council which shall be subject to the
approval of the Congress by appropriate Act or joint resolution,
providing for the numbers and types of armed forces, their degree
of readiness and general location, and the nature of facilities and
assistance, including rights of passage, to be made available to the
Security Council on its call for the purpose of maintaining interna-
tional peace and security in accordance with article 43 of said
Charter. The President shall not be deemed to require the authori-
zation of the Congress to make available to the Security Council
on its call in order to take action under article 42 of said Charter
and pursuant to such special agreement or agreements the armed
forces, facilities, or assistance provided for therein: .... "
Observe that the United Nations Participation Act ordains that the President
does not require congressional authorization to make U.S. armed forces
available to the Security Council to take action under Article 42. Further,
120. E. KEYNES, supra note 37, at xv.
121. D. MOYNIHAN, ON THE LAW OF NATIONS 112 (1990).
It would be one thing to persuade Congress to enter into a peacetime alliance with
the European countries that made up the nation's heritage. But they would never
accept a global string of regional military alliances. The United Nations has been
created to obviate any such need.
V. NEWTON, THE CAMBRIDGE SPIES: THE UNTOLD STORY OF MACLEAN, PHILBY, AND
BURGESS IN AMERICA 197 (1991).
122. 22 U.S.C. §§ 287 et seq.
123. Glennon, supra note 27, at 100-01; M. GLENNON, supra note 5, at 206.
124. 22 U.S.C. § 287d. This section continues:
Provided, That, except as authorized in section 287d-I of this title, nothing herein
contained shall be construed as an authorization to the President by the Congress
to make available to the Security Council for such purpose armed forces, facilities,
or assistance in addition to the forces, facilities, and assistance provided for in such
special agreement or agreements.
And section 287d-I provides that the President may upon U.N. request assign up to one thou-
sand troops as observers, guards and noncombatants supporting peaceful settlement of disputes
without armed force. 22 U.S.C. § 287d-1.
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observe that Article 42 calls for Security Council initiatives, including
blockade, utilizing the armed forces of U.N. member states when it considers
that, short of force, the Article 41 sanctions must be inadequate. But, no
such determination by the Security Council regarding the inadequacy of
sanctions ever was reached. W
Furthermore, observe that the United Nations Participation Act authorizes
the President to negotiate a special agreement or agreements with the
Security Council respecting the availability of American armed forces to the
Security Council. Article 43 of the U.N. Charter provides:
1. All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to
the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to
make available to the Security Council, on its calls and in
accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces,
assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for
the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.
2. Such agreement or agreements shall govern the numbers and
types of forces, their degree of readiness and general location, and
the nature of the facilities and assistance to be provided.
3. The agreement or agreements shall be negotiated as soon as
possible on the initiative of the Security Council. They shall be
concluded between the Security Council and Members or between
the Security Council and groups of Members and shall be subject
to ratification by the signatory states in accordance with their
respective constitutional processes."
The U.N. Charter itself demands the negotiation of such Security Council
special agreements prior to requisitioning forces from member states.1 27
When the problem of U.N. requisition of troops arose for detailed consid-
eration in 1945, John Foster Dulles, a member of the U.S. delegation to the
San Francisco conference at which the Charter was signed, informed the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee that a U.S.-U.N. agreement on
provision of troops should be regarded itself as a treaty needing a two-thirds
125. Urquhart, supra note 100, at 35, col. 1; O'Connell, supra note 23, at 479, 485.
If the Security Council were to act under Article 41 (non-use of force) or even
under Article 42 (Security Council's use of force), who is to decide, under what
standards and using what criteria, whether the Security Council has taken the
"necessary" measures for the maintenance of international peace and security?
Nanda, supra note 95, at 450.
126. U.N. CHARTER art. 43.
127. Glennon, supra note 27, at 90, citing Glennon, The Constitution and Chapter VII of
the U.N. Charter, A.J.I.L. 74 (Jan. 1991). "[A]rticles 42 through 44 of the United Nations
Charter are not self-executing provisions. In each case, the Security Council must negotiate
agreements with the member states to provide armed forces." E. KEYNES, supra note 37, at xv.
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approval1" from the Senate.1" The Security Council has yet to negotiate
such an agreement with any member state."3
The Charter of the United Nations at no time laid any duty upon the United
States to redeem Kuwait. Nor, did Congress by either resolution or
declaration of war, demand the commander in chief enforce Article 51. The
President moved toward his own goals between August 2, 1990, and January
12, 1991, citing specific authority for his efforts generally as commander in
chief, not from the democratically-elected Congress but from the United
Nations Security Council."' In theory, a Security Council might be
comprised of no democratic governments at all. In fact, the actual govern-
ments voting on the resolutions of August-November 1990 included few
democratic governments. What did democratically elected members of the
Congress do to ensure that their voices would be heard in the global clamor
over war and peace?"
VI. DELLUMS V. BUsH
Dellums v. Bush 33 was brought by plaintiffs, fifty-three U.S. Representa-
tives and one U.S. Senator, requesting an injunction preventing President
Bush from launching an offensive against Iraq absent a prior declaration of
128. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
129. Russett & Sutterlin, supra note 71, at 78; M. GLENNON, supra note 5, at 206.
130. Glennon, supra note 27, at 101; Franck & Patel, supra note 99, at 66, 70; O'Connell,
supra note 23, at 466.
131. According to Franck and Patel:
While the President was no doubt politically well-advised to consult fully with
Congress in this instance, time allowing, he is not obliged to secure what the new
system was created to make unnecessary: the nation's unilateral decision to go to
war.
If this is the correct position in international law, it also comports with the
intent of the drafters of the Constitution. The purpose of the war-declaring clause
was to ensure that this fateful decision did not rest with a single person. The new
system vests that responsibility in the Security Council, a body where the most
divergent interests and perspectives of humanity are represented and where five of
fifteen members have a veto power. This Council is far less likely to be
stampeded by combat fever than is Congress.
Franck & Patel, supra note 99, at 74. Franck and Patel's conflation of "humanity" with
governments is a widespread error. Worse is the breathtaking conflation of the "perspectives
of humanity" with those of dictatorships (e.g., the veto-bearing People's Republic of China).
132. Wrote Plutarch of Caius Marius:
It is told of him, that having at one time given the city to one thousand men of
Camerinum who had behaved valiantly in this war, and this seeming to be illegally
done, upon some one or other calling him to an account for it, he answered, that
the law spoke too softly to be heard in such a noise of war....
PLUTARCH, THE LIVES OF THE NOBLE GRECIANS AND ROMANS 511 (Modem Library ed., J.
Dryden trans. 1932).
133. 752 F. Supp. 1141 (D.D.C. 1990).
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war or similar express congressional authorization for such a military
move. 134 Judge Harold H. Greene of the U.S. District Court, District of
Columbia, briefly reviewed the history of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and the
deployment of U.S. and multinational forces to the Persian Gulf region
antecedent to President Bush's November 9, 1990, announced goal of an
offensive military capacity. He recounted that Congress had neither been
requested by President Bush to, nor independently chosen to, declare war 35
as it constitutionally is empowered to do." On November 19, 1990, the
plaintiffs brought their action on the premise that an American military
offensive was imminent but would be unlawful for want of a congressional
declaration of war, and that war without congressional concurrence would
deny the plaintiffs a voice constitutionally guaranteed them.
137
Judge Greene noted that the American Civil Liberties Union had filed a
memorandum as amicus curiae supportive of the plaintiffs' position; 13 on
that brief was University of California, Davis, Law School Professor Michael
J. Glennon. 139 Likewise, a number of other prominent law professors filed
an amicus curiae memorandum supporting the plaintiffs' stance."4 Their
names represent a rollcall of prestigious American constitutionalists: Bruce
A. Ackerman, Abram Chayes, Lori Fisler Damrosch, John Hart Ely, Erwin
N. Griswold, Gerald Gunther, Louis Henkin, Harold Hongju Koh, Philip B.
Kurland, Laurence H. Tribe, and William W. Van Alstyne.' 4
For the President, the Department of Justice opposed the motion for a
preliminary injunction and likewise moved to dismiss. The administration's
pleadings did not reach the merits. 42 The Department urged that the com-
plaint raised a nonjusticiable political question, that plaintiffs lacked standing,
that the plaintiffs' claim breached established canons of equity jurisprudence,
and that the interbranch allocation of warmaking powers issue remained
unripe. I'4
A. The Political Question Issue
Congress, under Article I, section 8 of the Constitution, not only enjoys the
power to declare war but to raise and support armies,'" provide and
134. Id. at 1143 n.1.
135. Id. at 1143-44.
136. U.S. CONST. a-t. I, § 8, dl. 11.
137. Dellums v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 1141, 1144 (D.D.C. 1990).
138. Id. at 1144, n.2.
139. Glennon, supra note 27, at 89 n.
140. Dellums v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 1141, 1144 n.2 (D.D.C. 1990).
141. Memorandum Amicus Curiae of Law Professors, Dellums v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 1141
(D.D.C. 1.C.1 1990).
142. Glennon, supra note 27, at 89.
143. Dellurns v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 1141, 1144 (D.D.C. 1990).
144. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
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maintain a navy, 14 make rules for the government and regulation of the
land and naval forces, 1" and to make such other laws as are necessary and
proper for execution of the enumerated powers.147 Article II meanwhile
vests the executive power in the President,'" and provides for the President
to be commander in chief of the army and navy.14 Relying upon the
political question doctrine," the Justice Department posited that the
existence simultaneously of all such provisions renders it impossible to isolate
the warmaking authority:"' the constitutional design must be to have these
varied provisions harmonized as a political rather than a legal matter.
1 52
The political question doctrine hinging upon both the separation of powers
and the inherent limitations of the judiciary, the Justice Department
contended that whether an American military offensive presents an act of
war, to be triggered by a congressional declaration, or impelled by the
President as commander in chief, is a judgment call beyond the assessment
of the objective facts.'
The court rejected the claims. Where, as in the Operation Desert Shield
context, the forces deployed are of such size and strength that no one
seriously could deny that war must ensue were they to engage in battle,
congressional approval clearly is required if Congress chooses to involve
itself.'"
Nonetheless, the Justice Department insisted that the Dellums case
remained a political question because to settle the dispute the judiciary must
inject itself into foreign affairs.' 55 The Court cited such major precedents
as United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp." and Youngstown Sheet
& Tube Co. v. Sawyer.'57 The former opinion had styled the President the
sole organ of the federal government in the foreign policy field. 5 The
latter had weighed whether, during the Korean War, President Harry S
Truman had moved unconstitutionally in ordering the Secretary of Commerce
to seize and operate most of the nation's steel mills. 5  (Such is the
145. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 13.
146. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, el. 14.
147. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
148. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1, cl. 1.
149. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
150. Dellu s v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 1141, 1145 (D.D.C. 1990).
151d. l at 1144.
152. Id. at 1144-45.
153. Id. at 1145.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 1146.
156. 299 U.S. 304 (1936); Swan, The Political Economy of Presidential Foreign
Poli ymaking: The Contemporary Theory of a Bifurcated Presidency, 21 CALIF. W. INT'L L.J.67, 72-74 (1990).
157. 343 U.S. 579 (1952); Swan, supra note 156, at 76-79.
158. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319-20 (1936).
159. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 582 (1952).
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propensity of the presidency to amass domestic power in the name of
international defense that in 1991 Truman's Counsel to the President, Clark
Clifford, still endorsed the option of a well-posthostilities (1946) takeover by
Truman of the national coal and railroad industries undergoing labor unrest,
to impress foreign tyrants with Truman's strength;"w even thus does the
national security state eclipse the entirety of the presidency.16 ') The court
concluded the Justice Department to be wrong. Courts routinely decide cases
which relate to, or even substantially impact upon, defense and foreign
policy. 162
B. Ange v. Bush
Judge Greene's refusal in Dellums to apply the political doctrine defense
contrasts with U.S. District Court, District of Columbia, Judge Royce C.
Lamberth's simultaneous December 13, 1990, opinion in Ange v. Bush.1"
The Ange plaintiff, Sergeant Michael Ray Ange, had claimed in relevant part
that an order from President Bush deploying Ange to the Persian Gulf had
exceeded the presidential authority" under both the War Powers
Clause" and the War Powers Resolution." Judge Lamberth dismissed
that portion of that case, argued at a hearing of December 10, 1990,67
challenging Ange's deployment order as positing nonjusticiable political
questions"' (which the court also found not yet ripe)."
Sergeant Ange had requested an injunction requiring he be returned to the
160. C. CLIFFORD, COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT: A MEMOIR 88 (1991).
Under the urgency of telephone and coal strikes in the wintdr of 1946, Congress
addressed itself to the problems raised by "national emergency" strikes and
lockouts. The termination of wartime seizure powers on December 31, 1946,
brought these matters to the attention of Congress with vivid impact. A proposal
that the President be given powers to seize plants to avert a shutdown where the
'health or safety' of the nation was endangered, was thoroughly canvassed by
Congress and rejected.
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 598-599 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.)
(emphasis added).
161. "[S]ince 1945, ...one presidential role, that of commander in chief, has come to
predominate over all others." Will .... And John Sonunu Over the Line, Wash. Post, June 30,
1990, at C7, cols. 3-4. Pulitzer Prize-winning political journalist Dr. George F. Will in this
essay cites to the Wilson passage quoted at the opening of the instant article. Id. at col. 4.
162. Dellums v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 1141, 1146 (D.D.C. 1990).
163. 752 F. Supp. 509 (D.D.C. 1990).
164. Id. at 510.
165. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
166. 50 U.S.C. § 1541, et seq. (1973).
167. Ange v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 509, 510 (D.D.C. 1990).
168. Id.
169. "Because the court cannot find the President's 'threat' to involve the United States in
war without Congressional consent is anything but speculative, the court finds that Ange's War
Powers Clause and War Powers Resolution claims are not ripe for judicial review." Id. at 515.
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U.S. 'I The Ange opinion explained that each of the determinations sought
in the Sergeant's challenges to the presidential moves in the Gulf was one
which the judiciary cannot render under the separation of powers principles
embodied within the judiciary's equitable discretion and in the political
question doctrine."' It decided that the Constitution entrusts resolution of
the war powers dispute to the political branches rather than to the courts."i
Should Congress conclude the President's deployment in the Gulf to have
been unconstitutional, according to the Ange opinion, Congress could declare
war on its own, exploit its appropriations power to frustrate further military
action in the Gulf, or impeach the President."I Judge Lamberth did
recognize that Ange presented a dispute wherein the plaintiff might not obtain
any relief, because the Sergeant might not motivate Congress to forestall
what Ange felt an unconstitutional usurpation of the congressional war
power: 74  violations of the Constitution might, sometimes, go
unredressed. 75
C. The Issues of Standing, Remedy, and Ripeness
The Justice Department next asserted in Dellums that the plaintiffs lacked
standing to pursue their action. 76 Those plaintiffs averred that their
interests guaranteed by the Constitution's War Clause was in imminent
danger of being compromised by a presidential assault against Iraq."TI The
court determined this to be a legally-cognizable injury, members of Congress
having a plain interest in defending their right to vote on questions entrusted
constitutionally to their respective chambers.1 78 When the Department of
Justice discounted the threat of injury in Dellums as a mere possibility, 79
the court disagreed. With nearly 400,000 American troops stationed in Saudi
Arabia, with their troop rotation and leaves suspended, and with the
President having vigorously acted to elicit a U.N. Security Council resolution
authorizing the use of force to evict the Iraqis from Kuwait, it was
disingenuous to characterize the plaintiff's allegations of the imminent
prospect of a military offensive as conjectural and remote."
170. Id. at 511.
171. Id. at 512.
172. Id. at 514.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 518 n.8.
175. Id., citing Melcher v. Federal Open Market Committee, 836 F. 2d 561, 565 (D.C.
Cir. 1987).
176. Dellums v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 1141, 1147 (D.D.C. 1990).
177. Id.
178. Id., citing Moore v. United States House of Representatives, 733 F.2d 946, 950 (D.C.
Cir. 1984).
179. Dellums v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 1141, 1147 (D.D.C. 1990).
180. Id. at 1148.
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The Department of Justice raised, too, the doctrine of remedial discretion,
evidencing as it does a concern for the separation of powers engendered
when a member of Congress asks a court to rule on a statute's
constitutionality simply due to the member's failure to win the backing of a
majority of his colleagues. However, the decisions which on the basis of this
doctrine have dismissed actions have almost invariably involved
congressional plaintiffs locked in intracongressional battles or seeking a
ruling upon a statute's constitutionality."' In the former situation the
congressional plaintiff has the remedy of changing or enforcing the internal
rules of Congress; in the latter, the remedy is repeal or amendment of the
alleged supposedly unconstitutional enactment." Yet in Dellums neither
such remedy could afford the relief sought by plaintiffs; this defense was,
consequently, rebuffed by the court."
Dellums declares that an injunction may issue at the solicitation of
Members of Congress to prevent a war about to be unleashed without
congressional authorization.' But Congress had not indicated whether it
felt a declaration of war either necessary or imprudent., Hence, the
Dellums court elected the course charted in Justice Lewis F. Powell's
concurrence in Goldwater v. Carter:" a congressional-presidential dispute
remains unready for judicial review until each branch has acted to assert its
constitutional authority. 17
It scarcely would be fitting for a court-by an injunctive decision (called
for by only some ten percent of its membership) that unless Congress
declares war the President is immobilized-to force a choice upon
Congress.""' Plaintiffs cannot, via an injunctive suit against the President,
receive relief from the action or inaction of their congressional col-
leagues.'" The President similarly is entitled to protection from an
injunction respecting a declaration when there is no evidence that this is the
desire of the legislative branch (as distinguished from a fraction thereof)."g
The majority of Congress alone is competent to declare war, and
consequently that majority alone can seek a judicial order forestalling the
executive from in effect declaring war.' 9'
181. Id.
182. Id. at 1149.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 1149-50.
186. 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
187. Id. at 997-98 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment); Swan, supra note 30,
at 401.
188. Dellums v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 1141, 1150-51 (D.D.C. 1990).
189. Id. at 1151 n.27.
190. Id. at 1151.
191. Id.
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VII. THE DELLUMS AFTERMATH
Representative Dellums on December 13, 1990, announced his satisfaction
with Judge Greene's ruling in Dellums.1" Judge Greene having indicated
the necessity for Congress as a body to advance its claim to Persian Gulf war
decisionmaking, Representative Dellums said: "We are in the process of
framing that strategy now." 1" Director of the American Civil Liberties
Union Washington Office Morton H. Halperin that day added:
It is now crucial that Congress pass a Concurrent Resolution that
says no offensive military action shall be initiated by U.S. forces
in the Persian Gulf without the affirmative approval of Congress
as required by article I, section 8, clause 11 of the U.S.
Constitution. Such a resolution will be offered in the House when
it reconvenes on January 3 by Congressman Charles Bennett
(D-FL) and Richard Durbin (D-IL). The Senate should take up
the same measure at that time as well, and upon passing the
resolution, both Houses should join the Dellums lawsuit." 4
There would, nonetheless, be no Concurrent Resolution saying no
offensive military action should be initiated by American forces in the
Persian Gulf without the affirmative approval of Congress. On Thursday,
November 8, 1990, twelve days after adjournment of the 101st
Congress,' Bush had told a news briefing:
After consultation with King Fahd of Saudi Arabia and our other
allies, I have today directed the Secretary of Defense to increase
the size of U.S. forces committed to Desert Shield to ensure that
the coalition has an adequate offensive military option should that
be necessary to achieve our common goals. Toward this end, we
will continue to discuss the possibility of both additional allied
force contributions and appropriate United Nation actions.
Iraq's brutality, aggression, and violations of international law
192. R. Dellums, Press Release, Dellums Pleased With Court Ruling on His Suit, (Dec. 13,
1990) (available at California Western School of Law).
193. Id.
194. M. Halperin, Press Release, ACLU Calls Greene Opinion in Dellums Case a Great
Victory for the Constitution, (Dec. 13, 1990) (ACLU News) (available at California Western
School of Law).
195. "[W]hat happened on November 8-two days after the election- . . . suddenly
lurched us into a Cold War mode." Moynihan, A Return to Cold War Thinking (Speech of
January 10, 1991), in THE GULF READER: HISTORY, DOCUMENTS, OPINIONS, supra note 14,
at 284.
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cannot be allowed to succeed...."
The majority leadership of the Senate and House had been given special
authority to call the 101st Congress back into session under the unusual terms
of the October 27, 1990, adjournment resolution.1" That instrument
resolved:
That when the House adjourns on the legislative day of October
27, 1990, and the Senate adjourns on Saturday, October 27,
Sunday, October 28 or Monday, October 29, 1990, they stand
adjourned sine die or until noon on the second day after Members
are notified to reassemble pursuant to section 2 of this concurrent
resolution.
Sec. 2. The Speaker of the House and the Leader of the Senate,
acting jointly after consultation with the Minority Leader of the
House and the Minority Leader of the Senate, shall notify the
Members of the House and Senate, respectively, to reassemble
whenever, in their opinion, the public interest shall warrant it.'"
Senators ranging from Edward M. Kennedy to Richard Lugar urged the
leadership to recall Congress into session immediately after the President's
November 8, 1990, announcement." 9 The primary justification for inaction
was that the 101st Congress had become a lame-duck.'
While the White House opined that the President did not need a
congressional declaration of war, President Bush wanted a congressional
resolution that would lift any doubt-particularly concerning the Saudis and
other coalition partners-that the American populace was willing to fight for
196. The President's News Conference: November 8, 1990, Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents, Nov. 12, 1990, at 1789, 1790.
Q. Mr. President, it sounds like you're going to war. You have moved from a
defensive position to an offensive position, and you have not said how many more
troops you are sending or, really, why.
The President. Well, I've said why right now. And I hope it's been very clear
to the American people.
Q. Are there new reasons that have moved this posture?
The President. No, it's just continuing to do what we feel is necessary to complete
our objectives, to fulfill our objectives, that have been clearly stated.
Id. at 1791.
197. Glennon, supra note 27, at 97.
198. H. Cong. Res. 399, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., Cong. Re. H. 12370, S. 16999, (daily
ed. Oct. 27, 1990).
199. Glennon, supra note 27, at 97.
200. Id.
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the liberation of Kuwait." 1  As early as November 14, 1990, President
Bush had met with bipartisan congressional leaders and read aloud Iraqi
headlines picturing American disunity, and also pulled out a pocketsized copy
of the Constitution to read: "The President shall be Commander-in-Chief.
•.. "W2 He then had solicited the leadership to call a postelection special
session of Congress, but only if the President were to receive a substantial
vote favoring his military initiatives.'
During November 1990,1 Secretary Baker had persuaded Foreign
Minister Shevardnadze to accept the "all necessary means" language of
proposed Security Council Resolution 678. Baker said that since Baker
would be temporary president of the Security Council for the Resolution 678
voting, Baker would afterward characterize the language as unambiguously
authorizing "force"; Baker's characterization would form a part of the
permanent record, and so interpret "all necessary means" if unobjected
to." After the divided vote, Baker indeed said: "Today's resolution is
very clear. The words authorize the use of force .... ""
On January 8, 1991, President Bush met in the Cabinet Room with his
White House legal counsel, C. Boyden Gray, and with the senior lawyers
from the departments.' The President asked for evaluation of his legal
authority to conduct military operations against the Iraqis? 8  Deputy
Attorney General William P. Barr replied that in the opinion of Barr and of
the senior department lawyers the President holds complete authority to
conduct military operations, as the commander in chief (regardless of
whether Congress voted a supporting resolution).' Barr reported that the
President is constitutionally empowered to employ the armed forces and the
Congress is constitutionally empowered to provide those forces and the laws
whereunder they serve. The congressional remedy for utilization of the
armed forces in ways Congress disapproves is to take away the military's
funding.
Even a congressional resolution inconsistent with the President's war policy
would not negate the presidential authority: Congress merely could withhold
funding or disband the forces.10
On January 9, 1990, President Bush shared this exchange at his press
201. R. PYLE, supra note 21, at 125.
202. B. WOODWARD, supra note 2, at 326, quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
203. B. WOODWARD, supra note 2, at 326.
204. Id. at 333.
205. Id. at 334.
206. Id. at 335.
207. Id. at 356.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 356-57. On October 16, 1991, President Bush nominated Barr to be Attorney
General. Rosenthal, Bush Nominates Deputy as Head of Justice Dept., N.Y. Times, Oct. 17,
1991, at 1, col 1.
210. B. WOODWARD, supra note 2, at 357.
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conference regarding a Congressional use of force resolution:
Q. Do you think you need such a resolution? And if you lose it,
would you be bound to that?
The President. I don't think I need it. I think Secretary Cheney
expressed it very well the other day. There are different opinions
on either side of this question, but Saddam Hussein should be
under no question on this: I feel that I have the authority to fully
implement the United Nations resolutions.
Q. And the question of being bound-the second part of that?
The President. I still feel that I have the constitutional
authority-many attorneys having so advised me.2"
Immediately following the January 9, 1991, meeting in Geneva of
Secretary Baker with Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz, President Bush told
his news conference:
I sent Secretary Jim Baker to Geneva, not to negotiate, but to
communicate, and I wanted Iraqi leaders to know just how
determined we are that the Iraqi forces leave Kuwait without
condition or further delay. Secretary Baker made clear that by its
full compliance with the twelve relevant United Nations Security
Council resolutions, Iraq would gain the opportunity to rejoin
the international community. And he also made clear-he also
made clear how much Iraq stands to lose if it does not comply.
Let me emphasize that I have not given up on a peaceful
outcome. It's not too late. I've just been on the phone
subsequent to the Baker press conference with King Fahd, with
President Mitterrand, to whom I've talked twice today, Prime
Minister Mulroney, and others are contacting other coalition
partners to keep the matter under lively discussion. It isn't too
late.
But now, as before, as it's been before, the choice of peace or
war is really Saddam Hussein's to make."'
These remarks prove, notwithstanding Dellums, the practical triviality (this
is not to say, legal triviality) of the January 12, 1991, Authorization for Use
of Military Force against Iraq Resolution. The President on November 8,
211. The President's News Conference: January 9, 1991, Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents, Jan. 14, 1991, at 23, 25.
212. Id. at 23.
[Vol. 22
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1990, announced his postelection offensive buildup, and on January 9, 1991,
announced his ultimatum ("not to negotiate") threatening "war" enforcing
Security Council Resolution 678. He did so although his administration took
no position on Arab-Arab border disagreements, although his original
preelection stance had been "wholly defensive," although enforcement of
Resolution 678 was not binding on the United States, when interpretation of
Resolution 678 as authorizing force was made by his own creature, the
Secretary of State, and although Congress had not yet resolved in favor of
the war option.
The retrospective military appraisal of the war proved be that the President
most ably had served as commander in chief by releasing his subordinates to
perform exactly the same as if they had no commander superior to them. As
General H. Norman Schwartzkopf summarized in his celebrated Central
Command briefing in Riyadh on February 27:213
Q: I'm wondering if your recommendation and analysis were
accepted without change.
A: I'm very thankful for the fact that the President of the United
States has allowed the United States military and the coalition
military to fight this war exactly as it should have been fought.
The President in every case has taken our guidance and our
recommendations to heart and has acted superbly as the
Commander-in-Chief of the United States.1 4
Here constitutional lawyers might ponder sociologist C. Wright Mills'
evaluation of the post- Curtiss-Wright military-industrial complex: "From the
military's standpoint, perhaps the ideal civilian at the top would be a front
to Congress but a willing tool of military decision."" 5 Also, constitu-
tionalists might heed a second feature of General Schwartzkopf's expression
of gratitude, beyond the military formulation of the superb commander in
chief as one who without exception takes guidance from his inferiors.
This General actually thinks the President is "Commander-in-Chief of the
United States." 216  However, the Constitution's President is just the
213. R. PYLE, supra note 21, at 239.
214. Id. at 7, 264 (emphasis supplied).
215. C. MILts, THE POWER EUTE 188 (1956).
216. R. PYLE, supra note 21, at 264. Like Gen. Schwartzkopf, former Lt. Col. Oliver L.
North greatly exaggerates the constitutional reach of being Commander in Chief:
The Constitution gives the president the chief responsibility for setting U.S.
foreign policy. That's why the Constitution refers to him as the "commander-in-
chief."
North, Congress should end the torture for good, CONSERVATIVE CHRONICLE, October 2, 1991,
at 14, col. 3. Both men confound a mere military Commander with a universal Commander.
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commander in chief of the federal armed forces, not of the country at large.
Indeed, the President only sometimes, and then conditionally, becomes
commander in chief of the state militias." 7 Since 1960, the President has
been identified not solely as the commander of the entire American people,
but of the whole free world.21 A constitutional clause supposed to keep
the military subordinate to a civilian President is nowadays cited to awe the
civilian citizenry with the aura glorifying the President through his tie to the
military. Given this aftermath of Dellums, who now will chain the dogs of
war?
VIII. WILL CONGRESS, OR THE COURTS, CHAIN THE DOGS OF WAR?
A. Glennon and Franck on the Dogs of War
In his Dellums postmortem, Professor Glennon found the record of
Presidents Bush's August 1990 unilateral military commitment in the Gulf to
the January 12, 1991, Authorization for Use of Military Force against Iraq
Resolution 9 offered the textbook example of a bold executive, compliant
legislature, and deferential judiciary pushing the constitutional separation of
powers system backward toward the King George II model.' If the
judiciary shrinks from intervening when the executive fundamentally menaces
the separation of powers, it is the executive which becomes final arbiter of
the Constitution."1 Glennon is not the only constitutional scholar to share
such concerns in light of Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert
217. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
218. As recalled by Dr. Garry Wills:
The President is the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, not of the citizenry
at large. But in his 1960 campaign [John F.] Kennedy assured us that the
American people yearn for leadership: "They want to know what is needed-4hey
want to be led by the Commander-in-Chief." And the President was not only the
Commander-in-Chief of all American people but of the whole free world-he must
be "a man capable of acting as the Commander-in-Chief of the grand alliance."
Hugh Sidey significantly called his chapter on counterinsurgent warfare in other
people's countries "Commander in Chief." Needless to say, the Constitution did
not set up military titles for foreigners to obey. But Kennedy-[Theodore C.]
Sorensen was convinced that all the world's free people yearned for a leader who
enjoyed the widest powers he could lay claim to.
G. WILIS, THE KENNEDY IMPRISONMENT: A MEDITATION ON POWER 179-80 (1982).
219. S.J. Res. 2, 102d Cong., 2d Sess., Cong. Rec. S. 403-S 404 (1991). "The evolution
of Anglo-American constitutionalism is in no small part a history of the decline of the
war-making power as a 'prerogative' power, a history of its transfer to legislative authorities."
M. GLENNON, supra note 5, at 228. Cf. id. at 285.
220. Glennon, supra note 27, at 84.
221. Id. at 94.
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Storm. Professor Edward Keynes' insisted on January 13, 1991,1 that
the only warmaking authority the President wields constitutionally is his
capacity to repel sudden attacks against America's soil, armed forces, or
citizenry at home or abroad.'
Glennon finds the flaw in the Powell approach adopted in Dellums to be
that it bars a court from invalidating an unconstitutional presidential ploy
unless Congress first reiterates the demands the Constitution makes from the
start.' Glennon proposes amending the War Powers Resolution' 6 to
facilitate judicial review by preventing a judicial retreat like that in
Dellums.' It can state expressly that presidential noncompliance with the
War Powers Resolution creates an impasse within the meaning of the
ripeness doctrine, and that the political question doctrine cannot afford
grounds for dismissal insofar as it is not constitutionally mandated.'
Consistent with Glennon, Dr. Thomas M. Franck,' shortly
post-Operation Desert Storm assailed the oft-quoted opinion' in United
States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp."3 cited in Dellums.' 2 He rues the
Curtiss-Wright suggestion that the President must be the sole organ in foreign
relations and that the federal government is vested with powers of external
222. "Edward Keynes and his former student Randall K. Miller have produced a
meritorious work [The Courts vs. Congress: Prayer, Busing, and Abortion, 1989] divisible into
two parts." Swan, Book Review, 7 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY 416 (1990).
223. E. KEYNES, supra note 37, at xvii.
224. Id. at xiii.
225. Glennon, supra note 27, at 95. Cf. M. GLENNON, supra note 5, at 323-25.
Suppose Congress rendered a split decision, i.e., the authorization to use force
passed one house but failed in the other. What if the House passed a measure
authorizing the use of military force, but the Senate passed a resolution prohibiting
the use of force in the Gulf without a specific declaration of war? What if only
one house of Congress passed any of these resolutions and the other house was
silent? Majority action by both houses of Congress, regardless of the outcome,
clearly makes the decision justiciable.
Clark, Questioning the Constitutional Distribution of War Powers in the Wake of the Iraqi Crisis
and Operation Desert Shield/Storm, 15 So. ILL. U.L.J. 669, 681 (1991).
226. 50 U.S.C. § 1547 (1973).
227. Glennon, supra note 27, at 99.
228. Id. at 99-100.
229. Dr. Franck is the author of, inter alia, FOREIGN PO1CY BY CONGRESS (1979);
CONTROL OF SEA RESOURCES BY SEMI-AUTONOMOUS STATES (1978); RESIGNATION IN PROTEST
(1975); SECRECY AND FOREIGN POLICY (1973); A FREE TRADE ASSOCIATION (1968); WHY
FEDERATIONS FAIL (1968); THE STRUCTURE OF IMPARTIALITY (1968); COMPARATIVE
CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS (1968); EAST AFRICAN UNrTY THROUGH LAW (1965); THE UNITED
NATIONS IN THE CONGRESS (1963); and RACE AND NATIONALISM (1960). Dr. Franck and Prof.
Glennon co-authored T. FRANCK & M. GLENNON, FOREIGN RELATIONS AND NATIONAL
SECURITY LAW (1988).
230. Franck, Courts and Foreign Policy, FOREIGN POuCY 66, 69 (No. 83 1991).
231. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
232. Dellums v. Bush, 852 F. Supp. 1141, 1146 (D.C.C. 1990).
37
Swan: SCHOLARLY OPINION - Presidential Undeclared Warmaking and Functio
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1991
112 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 22
sovereignty not dependent upon the Constitution's positive grants of power:233
"It would be difficult to think of a jurisprudential notion more at odds with
the text of the Constitution and the intent of its framers. "'
Just as Glennon hopefully promotes judicial review of foreign military
policy, Franck helpfully recounts that the experiences of two nations whose
constitutional structures resemble closely the U.S. system demonstrate the
workability of an expanded judicial review. 5  Both the Dominion of
Canada and the Federal Republic of Germany have written constitutions,
federal systems, and vested constitutional rights.' The Supreme Court of
Canada and the German Constitutional Court both have been invited to shun
foreign affairs matters; both specifically have rejected that invitation."
There is no credible reason why in the U.S. foreign relations, any more than
in Canada or Germany, should be exempt from a restricted yet systemicly
crucial level of court supervision."
The borders of the constitutionally tolerable expand or contract
circumstantially. Hence, once the judiciary reviews the constitutionality of
a foreign policy matter it at once inquires into those special circumstances
which comprise the foreign relations field. 9 Such questions must be re-
solved before the judiciary can rule upon foreign policy cases as they do
other cases.? Franck discovers answers for American judges with
respective precedents addressing a state gubernatorial power, and the federal
congressional power.
In the Supreme Court's 1932 opinion in Sterling v. Constantin," the
Justices reviewed a state governor's defense that he had expropriated the
plaintiff's property under the governor's constitutional authority to resist
insurrection and riot. He argued that because his decision was political it
was beyond judicial review. But Franck recounts that the Supreme Court
rejected this defense, instead fashioning the sensible rule of evidence that
great weight be accorded the governor's good faith belief in the necessity
summoning gubernatorial emergency measures. 2
233. Franck, supra note 230, at 69-70. Cf M. GLENNON, supra note 5, at 7-8.
234. Franck, supra note 230, at 70.
235. Id. at 79.
236. Id. But of course Canada's vested constitutional rights date only from 1982. Swan,
Article III, Section 2, Exceptions Clause Canadian Constitutional Parallels: Canada Teaches
the United States an American History Lesson, 13 CALIF. W. INT'L L.J. 37, 43 (1983); E.
McWHINNEY, CANADA AND THE CONSTTrUTON 1979-1982: PATRIATION AND THE CHARTER
OF RIGHTS (1982). The most recent discussion in the American legal literature of constitutional
control of military action in Germany is Damrosch, Constitutional Control of Military Actions:
A Comparative Dimension, 85 A.J.I.L. 92, 99-103 (1991).
237. Franck, supra note 230, at 79.
238. Id. at 81.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 82.
241. 187 U.S. 378 (1932).
242. Franck, supra note 230, at 82.
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In the Supreme Court's 1977 opinion in Fiallo v. Bell," Franck
approvingly records, the Supreme Court applied a corresponding evidentiary
rule in reviewing the equal protection constitutionality of a statute facially
discriminating by granting priority in applying for entry into the U.S. of the
illegitimate children of American mothers over those of American fathers:
"Applying a theory of 'limited judicial review,' the Court affirmed the
decision of the District Court, which had refused to overturn the distinction
chosen by Congress because the plaintiff had not shown that it was 'wholly
devoid of any conceivable rational purpose' or 'fundamentally aimed at
achieving a goal unrelated to the regulation of immigration.'""
B. Congress and the Dogs of War
Expanded judicial review of foreign warmaking, as under an amended War
Powers Resolution, Glennon feels imperative if that Resolution is not to be
repealed altogether.' Aside, at least, from the legislative veto case of INS
v. Chadha,2 Congress never has lost a war powers dispute against the
President which the Supreme Court has adjudicated on its merits.'7
Indeed, it has been said that never in history has the Supreme Court
invalidated any foreign relations enactment by Congress.' But, Glennon
unfortunately misapprehends the Constitution under which Congress has
operated through the generations following the 1936/1938 interval.
Since Curtiss-Wright the President has made foreign policy wholly
unchecked by any judicially-enforced principle of the Constitution. Since
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., Congress has made economic
policy entirely unchecked by any judicially-enforced principle of the
Constitution. (According to West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Justice
Richard Neely: "Legislatures are interested in economic rather than social
issues, because economic issues deliver the money or votes to win
elections."') Since United States v. Carolene Products Co, the federal
243. 430 U.S. 787 (1977).
244. Franck, supra note 230, at 83, quoting Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 791 (1977).
245. Glennon, supra note 27, at 98.
246. 462 U.S. 919 (1983); Swan, The Political Economy of the Separation of Powers:
Bowsher v. Synar, 17 CUMBERLAND L. REV. 795, 811-14 (1987). Cf M. GLENNON, supra note
5, at 98-99 and 108-109. "[In only one case .. . has any court invalidated an act of Congress
on the ground that it violated general presidential foreign-affairs powers." M. GLENNON, supra
note 5, at 13 (Glennon's emphasis) (citing National Federation of Federal Employees v. United
States, 695 F. Supp. 1196 (D.D.C. 1988)).
247. Glennon, supra note 27, at 98.
248. L. HENKIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM, DEMOCRACY, AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS 77 (1990).
249. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
250. R. NEELY, WHY COURTiS DON'T WORK 241 (1983).
251. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
One of the most extraordinary things about the last twenty years of civil rights law
is that Congress has had virtually noting ot do with large parts of it. The Griggs
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judiciary, especially the Supreme Court, has made social policy (particularly
over the states) absolutely unchecked by any principle of the Constitution.
The role of the states, who created the federal government, 2 is simply to
obey these federal organs even through the point (of interest given Operations
Desert Shield and Desert Storm) of the call of their National Guards to active
duty to train abroad in peacetime with neither the consent of their state
governors nor a declaration of national emergency.2"
Curtiss-Wright most properly is analogized to Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp. because both (not merely the latter) demonstrate judicial retreat from
constitutionally checking the two other branches of the federal government
during the New Deal. In the famous 1935 case of A.L.A. Schechter Poultry
Corp. v. United States,' the Supreme Court had invalidated under the
delegation doctrine a statutory centerpiece of the New Deal 5 because the
President had been empowered to impose upon the poultry industry virtually
any regulation he liked.' s In Curtiss-Wright, the Supreme Court hastened
to concede that what would be invalid under the delegation doctrine if
directed toward domestic issues need not be invalid if aimed at foreign
relations. 7
Glennon argues:
If the President, acting alone, promulgated a new tax code and
directed executive branch officials to commence its
implementation, would that not represent a plain constitutional
violation that the courts have full power to overturn? There is no
reason to think that under such circumstances-or the facts of
Dellums, where the president claimed power to commence war
against Iraq--the courts are powerless to act unless effectively
permitted to do so by Congress.2"
disparate impact test and virtually the entire law of affirmative action were forged
by federal judges and administrative agencies, not Congress. And though Congress
came close to assuming responsibility for these policies when it amended Title VII
in 1972, it backed off then and has silently acquiescent ever since.
Something seems to have gone wrong in a democracy when Congress does not
assue responsibility for policies that so fundamentally change the country.
Gewirth, Discrimination Endgame, NEW REPUBuC, Aug. 12, 1991, at 18, 22, citing Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). Yale Law School Professor Paul Gewirth does not-
understand the separation of powers has been supplanted with a devision of labor assigning social
policy to the federal courts.
252. U.S. CONST. art. VII.
253. Perpich v. Department of Defense, 110 L. Ed. 2d 312, 110 S. Ct. 2418 (1990).
Members of the National Guard are not even subject to the U.S. Code of Military Justice except
when in federal status. 22 U.S.C. § 109(b).
254. 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
255. M. GLENNON, supra note 5, at 18.
256. Id. at 197.
257. Id. at 19.
258. Glennon, supra note 27, at 95-96.
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Glennon's taxation/warfare parallel is inapposite to the post-1936/1938
realities of three unchecked branches of an unchecked central government.
Congress, as Justice Neely's words suggest, clutches economic policymaking
power to aggrandize itself by offering bread and circuses, and so would resist
presidential interbranch encroachments concerning taxation. Meanwhile, each
president can gamble upon aggrandizing himself by playing Caesar, as
suggested by the second of the passages prefacing the instant article. Both
branches batten longterm thanks to their division of labor. Thus, the political
economy of presidential undeclared warmaking. Hence, the contemporary
theory of a bifurcated presidency, whereunder the President makes foreign
policy wholly unchecked while sharing with Congress domestic lawmaking
chores. While Glennon's hypothetical presidential tax system concededly
would call forth Congressional resistance, 9 the President's actual
undeclared foreign war ultimatum of January 9, 199 1, brought forth only the
January 12, 1991, Authorization for Use of Military Force against Iraq
Resolution.
The indignant Glennon delivers no news in comparing the events of
1990-1991 with the reign of George III. Phillip Kurland (who jointly filed
the amicus curiae brief for the Dellums plaintiff) made this point in the
1970s:
The spending power and the commerce power as construed by the
Supreme Court have afforded government hegemony over all
affairs of the citizens and residents of this nation. The national
government is free to regulate everything, except that it must
conform to the Supreme Court's interpretation of the limitations
imposed by the Bill of Rights [i.e., social policy] and other
specific limitations spelled out in the Constitution itself. From a
government of delegated powers it has become a sovereignty with
jurisdiction no different from that of the nation from which it
seceded in 1776.1 °
Far from affronting Congress, this is the system Congress favors.
Speaking predictively, the amended War Powers Resolution and meaningful
judicial review favored by Glennon and by Franck are a combination not in
the cards, as indicated by authorities they themselves cite.
Glennon remembers accurately that it was during the 1970s that the
renaissance of congressional power over foreign affairs attained its peak.h 1
But the November 7, 1973, War Powers Resolution itself expressly directs
the judiciary never to interpret congressional appropriations as authorizing
259. Cf. id. at 95; M. GLENNON, supra note 5, at 17, citing Yoshida International, Inc. v.
United States, 378 F. Supp. 1155 (Cust. Ct. 1974), rev'd, 526 F.2d 560 (C.C.P.A. 1975).
260. P. KURLAND, WATERGATE AND THE CONSTITUTION 174 (1978).
261. Glennon, supra note 27, at 98.
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military actions unless Congress so provides explicit authorization in
legislation:
Authority to introduce United States Armed Forces into hostilities
or into situations wherein involvement in hostilities is clearly
indicated by the circumstances shall not be inferred-
(1) from any provision of law whether or not in effect before
November 7, 1973, including any provision contained in any
appropriation Act, unless such provision specifically authorizes the
introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into
such situations and states that it is intended to constitute specific
statutory authorization within the meaning of this chapter; or
(2) from any treaty heretofore or hereafter ratified unless such
treaty is implemented by legislation specifically authorizing the
introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into
such situations and stating that it is intended to constitute specific
statutory authorization within the meaning of this chapter. 2
Even at its boldest, Congress wanted to fund warfare without actually
taking responsibility for war itself. However noisily they enjoy playing
backseat driver, the pusillanimous' U.S. Senators and Representatives of
1992, like their predecessors, recoil from grasping the wheel. No vote is
more career-threatening than the vote on war or peace.2
C. The Courts and the Dogs of War
Franck is accurate that Sterling flatly denied that an executive's range of
discretion conclusively supports by executive fiat any move a governor takes,
however unjustified by exigency or subversive of private rights and the
otherwise available jurisdiction of the courts.' A governor does have a
262. 50 U.S.C. § 1547(a) (1973).
263.
But I remember, when the fight was done, When I was dry with rage and extreme
toil, Breathless and faint, leaning upon my sword, Came there a certain lord, neat,
trimly dressed, Fresh as a bridegroom ...
. . he smiled and talked; And as the soldiers bore dead bodies by, He called them
untaught knaves, unmannerly, To bring a slovenly unhandsome corse, Betwixt the
wind and his nobility.
W. Shakespeare, Henry IV (Part 1), Act I, scene 3, lines 30-34 and 41-45. The late Gen.
Joseph W. Stillwell declared often that these lines were from his favorite passage in
Shakespeare. J. STILLWELL, THE STILLWELL PAPERS xvi (T. White ed. 1948). "[W]e are the
step-children of World War II. (Election coming up.) I am getting sour enough about this
pusillanimous proceeding to warrant being called Vinegar Joe." Id. at 344 (letter of Oct. 17,
1944, from J. W. Stillwell to Mrs. Winifred A. Stillwell).
264. Glennon, supra note 27, at 96. Cf. M. GLENNON, supra note 5, at 120-21.
265. Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378, 400-01 (1932).
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permitted scope of action wherein to meet force with force.' Yet in
situations both of insurrection and of the theater of actual war the seizure or
destruction of private property is a right engendered by the emergency,
which emergency must be shown before the taking is justified. 7
However, the Supreme Court's focus in Sterling was different from
Franck's:
The question before us is simply with respect to the Governor's
attempt to regulate by executive order the lawful use of
complainants' properties in the production of oil. Instead of
affording them protection in the lawful exercise of their rights as
determined by the courts, he sought, by his executive orders, to
make that exercise impossible. In the place of judicial procedure,
available in the courts which were open and functioning, he set up
his executive commands which brooked neither delay nor appeal.
In particular, to the process of the Federal court actually and
properly engaged in examining and protecting an asserted Federal
right, the Governor interposed the obstruction of his will,
subverting the Federal authority. The assertion that such action
can be taken as conclusive proof of its own necessity and must be
accepted as in itself due process of law has no support in the
decisions of this Court.'6
The true lesson of Sterling is, as suggested in Section VIII B above, that
the states dance to the tune of federal judges even regarding the quelling of
unrest within their own borders:
If it be assumed that the Governor was entitled to declare a state
of insurrection and to bring military force to the aid of civil
authority, the proper use of that power in this instance was to
maintain the Federal court in the exercise of its jurisdiction and
not to attempt to override it; to aid in making its process effective
and not to nullify it, to remove, and not to create, obstructions to
the exercise by the complainants, of their rights as judicially
declared.'
The true lesson of Fiallo is, as suggested in Section VIII B above, that
Congress makes economic policy wholly unchecked by any
judicially-enforced constitutional principle. Fiallo declares that since
decisions over matters like immigration implicate America's relations with
266. Id. at 399-400.
267. Id. at 401.
268. Id. at 401-02 (emphasis supplied).
269. Id. at 404 (emphasis supplied).
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foreign powers, and inasmuch as a broad variety of classifications must be
established in view of shifting political and economic contexts, the rationales
precluding judicial review of political questions dictate also a narrow
standard of review of congressional or presidential decisions regarding
immigration and naturalization.' Fiallo deferentially admits that "The
Court has repeatedly emphasized that 'over no conceivable subject is the
legislative power of Congress more complete that it is over' the admission
of aliens."" 1 Fiallo dissenters former Justices Marshall and Brennan,
unlike Franck, grasped that exclusion of aliens on grounds of gender and
illegitimacy are reviewed via a test which "turns out to be completely
'toothless'."' In fact, a standard treatise comprehends Fiallo by sharp
contrast with Franck's reading of Fiallo: "This decision comports with
decisions deferring to the legislative power over immigration and
naturalization."'
The Fiallo teaching that Congress makes economic policy entirely
unchecked by any judicially-enforced constitutional rule is the more vivid
considering that Fiallo could have been treated by the Supreme Court as a
social policy controversy (turning upon nationality, marriage and sex); the
latter policy controversies are federal judicial, not congressional, turf under
the post-1936/1938 federal interbranch division of labor. The Justices
instead recognized the Fiallo issue as one within the economic policymaking
field; therein Congress roams unchecked. The labor force in the United
States, unlike that in Canada, shares a two thousand mile-long border with
the Third World.
IX. THE CRISIS OF 1990-1991 AS CONSTITUTIONAL LESSON
A. Post-Curtiss Wright Undeclared War in 1991
The post-1936/1938 federal-level executive, legislative and judicial branch
division of labor along foreign, economic, and social policymaking lines
respectively was sensed immediately after the acceptance of Resolution 687
by Iraq. Political journalist Chris Matthews then reported Congress to be
charting economic policy unchallenged, while the President likewise
captained foreign policy unchecked:
Instead of competing for our support, as they once did
270. Fiallo v. Bell, 403 U.S. 787, 796 (1977), quoting Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67,
81-82 (1976).
271. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977), quoting Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v.
Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 339 (1909).
272. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 805 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting). "Mhe Court
appears to hold that discrimination among citizens, however invidious and irrational, must be
tolerated if it occurs in the context of the immigration laws." Id. at 800.
273. M. NowAK & R. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 732 (4th ed. 1991).
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passionately, Republicans and Democrats now openly collude.
Instead of fighting over foreign and domestic policy, they partition
the territory--one gets to control foreign affairs and big-picture
economic policy, the other gets custody of domestic issues like
health and Social Security.
Which party loses in this flagrant division of the political
spoils?
The American voter. Instead of getting two options in the
foreign, economic and social policy issues, he gets one. If the
citizen doesn't like what George Bush is offering on foreign
policy, the citizen's out of luck. If the voter doesn't like what the
Democrats are saying on home-front matters like health insurance
or family leave legislation, he's got little alternative. George
Bush is too busy running the world.
The fact is, both parties have traded territory for peace. To
avoid looking weak on defense, the Democrats no longer put
forward a foreign policy. Except for an occasional sniper shot at
the president's treatment of the Kurds, we don't hear a peep from
them about what the U.S. should be doing in the world.
The Republicans have made a similar deal. To avoid looking
nasty on social programs, they no longer talk about them. When
was the last time you heard a Republican mention the two words
"Social Security"? The purpose of this sweet little deal is obvious.
By not risking any serious attack on home-front problems,
Republicans get to maintain their control of the presidency. By
not having a foreign policy, Democrats avoid jeopardizing their
seats on Capitol Hill.274
As a political journalist, Matthews understandably perceives matters
dividing along partisan lines. A constitutional lawyer could read his evidence
as not bespeaking a two-way partisan division of labor. She would perceive
a tripartite division of branches-allocation of unchecked power (with the
federal judiciary wielding unchecked national social policymaking authority).
While Matthews supposes Congress to be a social policymaker, his actual
274. Matthews, Partition Politics, LIBERAL OPINION, Apr. 22, 1991, at 9, cols. 1, 2.
If you think this an overstatement, give yourself this pop quiz: What is the
Democratic Party's foreign policy these days? What is the Democrats' fiscal
policy? What is the Republican Party's domestic program? Welcome to "partition
politics," a system that guards the parties from any risk and the voters from any
choice.
Id. at col. 2. c. Matthews, Parenthood, NEW REPuBuC, May 20, 1991, at 15. Christopher
Matthews was a 1980 speechwriter for President Jimmy Carter. C. MATrHEWS, HARDBALL:
How POuITICs IS PLAYED-ToLD BY ONE WHO KNOWS THE GAME 42 (1988).
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examples (health insurance, Social Security, family leave) exemplify
Congressional expansion of the welfare state.'7 5
Executive branch dismissal of a Congressional role in foreign warmaking
as Operation Desert Storm loomed was represented by the November 13,
1990, meeting of Secretary of Defense Richard B. Cheney with a hundred
U.S. Representatives. The primary topic of their meeting was the
President's post-election shift to an offensive option against Iraq. The erup-
tion in the room hardened Cheney's belief that Congress was unequipped to
handle the matter"6 : "He found himself thinking of August 1941, just four
months before Pearl Harbor, when the House was able to muster only a
one-vote margin for continuing the Selective Service system."' 7
B. Post-Curtiss-Wright Undeclared War Before Pearl Harbor
In 1936, the year of Curtiss-Wright, the Congressional Joint Army and
Navy Selective Service Committee was assigned Army Major Lewis B.
Hershey" 8 as its executive officer and secretary. 9  By midsummer
1940, the Committee established a national headquarters and alerted
previously-selected officers to set up state Selective Service programs.'
The Burke-Wadsworth bill of June 1940, provided for conscription for a year
of service by 1,400,000 men and the incorporation of the National Guard
into federal service."s  President Franklin D. Roosevelt in July 1940,
publicly announced his support. A few weeks later the bill was endorsed by
Republican presidential candidate Wendell L. Willkie. The bill was passed
in September and the President signed it in a White House ceremony.'
By August 1941, the 1940 conscription law was about to expire.
Republicans were withholding the votes of several Representatives opposing
the Selective Service Extension Act, and several others planned to switch
their votes to opposition from support once they saw how many votes were
necessary to defeat the measure. House rules permitted a member to switch
his vote until the result was announced. But they were denied their option
when Speaker of the House Sam Rayburn read the vote figures of 203 for the
bill and 202 opposed. He at once pounded his gavel and announced the vote
275. Matthews does assign one social policy to the President: "Except for that old
perennial, the crime bill, President Bush might as well be General Secretary of the United
Nations." Matthews, Partition Politics, supra note 274, at 9, col. 2. But his own language
exposes presidential crimefighting ("that old perennial") as status quo politics.
276. B. WOODWARD, supra note 2, at 325.
277. Id.
278. G. FLYNN, LEWIS B. HERSHEY: MR. SELECTVE SERVICE (1985).
279. L. ROTHENBERG, THE DRAFr AND YOU 10 (1968).
280. Id.
281. E. LARRABEE, COMMANDER IN CHIEF: FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT, HIS
LIEUTENANTS, AND THEIR WAR 117 (1987).
282. Id.
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to freeze it:' "He had stretched House rules to a point at which they
would have broken had not the power of his iron personality stood behind his
rulings. .. "
On September 11, 1941, President Roosevelt announced his order to shoot
on sight German or Italian war vessels in the sea shielding America.' On
October 16, 1941, the U.S.S. Kearney, south of Iceland, was struck by a
torpedo which killed eleven crewmen.' On October 31, 1941, the
American destroyer Reuben James, while engaging in convoy duty, was
torpedoed and sank: 115 lives were lost.' The undeclared presidential
war of 1941 flowed into declared hostilities as of December 1941. In the
course of the Second World War 75 percent of Army troops were procured
by the draft; additional volunteers derived through threat of conscription."'
Dellums and the martial events of 1990-1991 teach the constitutional lesson
that the potent post-Curtiss-Wright armed forces are wielded abroad at
presidential discretion, wholly unchecked by any judicially-enforced
constitutional rule. Dellums, Operation Desert Shield, and Operation Desert
Storm thus reiterate the constitutional lesson of 1941, which witnessed the
initial post-Curtiss-Wright undeclared foreign war. That undeclared
presidential war, having no large standing military machine to exploit, reaped
conscripts raised by America's first peacetime draft. In these two undeclared
wars, as in the intervening eleven years of Korean and Indochina warfare,
Congress contented itself with economic policymaking unchecked by any
judicially-enforced constitutional rule.
Articles I, II, and III of the Constitution have been superseded by Jones
and Laughlin Steel Corp., Curtiss-Wright, and Carolene Products and a
central government completely unchecked because no longer restraining
itself.
283. R. CARO, THE YEARS OF LYNDON JOHNSON: THE PATH TO POWER 595 (1983); J.
BURNS, ROOSEVELT: THE SOLDIER OF FREEDOM 120, 142 (1970).
284. R. CARO, supra note 283, at 595.
285.
In the waters which we deem necessary for our defense, American naval vessels
and American planes will no longer wait until Axis submarines lurking under the
water, or Axis raiders on the surface of the sea, strike their deadly blow-first.
Upon our naval and air patrol-now operating in large number over a vast expanse
of the Atlantic Ocean-falls the duty of maintaining the American policy of
freedom of the seas-now. That means, very simply, very clearly, that our
patrolling vessels and plans will protect all merchant ships--not only American
ships but ships of any flag-engaged in commerce in our defensive waters. They
will protect them from submarines; they will protect them from surface raiders.
Roosevelt, When You See a Rattlesnake Poised to Strike, You Do Not Wait Until He Has Struck
(Sept. 11, 1941), in 10 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 384,
391 (1969).
286. J. BURNS, supra note 284, at 141.
287. A. DECONDE, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 602 (1963).
288. J. HELMER, THE DEADLY SIMPLE MECHANICS OF SOCIETY 198 (1974) (data for
1941-1946).
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C. Post-Curtiss-Wright Declarations of War
A standard constitutional treatise related in 1991 of Article I, section 8,
clause 11: "The purpose of this clause was to transfer to Congress a power
that in Great Britain belonged to the king, the executive branch. This
purpose has not been realized."' Has this atrophy of the congressional
declaration of war constituted a threat to the people's freedom?
There is some plausibility for those legal analysts jealously protective of
American liberties to press for an outright declaration of war under Article
I whenever possible before U.S. entry into international hostilities, and to
denounce the waging of undeclared wars. Congressional voting on the
declaration facilitates, more accurately than would a President's exercise of
wide discretion as commander in chief under Article II, decisionmaking
about war and peace nearly reflective of the wishes of the American people
overall. Because Congress cannot command a mighty military machine
expanded in wartime, Senators and Representatives may have more incentive
to resist unnecessary conflicts, and so protract Americans' enjoyment of their
liberties at peace. However, the law affords prudential counterarguments
whereby libertarian partisans, recognizing the need from time to time to
engage in hostilities abroad,' might decline an insistence upon the
declaration of war, and with an eye to guarding the people's freedom prefer
to acquiesce in undeclared warfare.
The congressional act of declaring war triggers grave changes. It brings
into play the laws of war: territorial courts may be established,
foreign-owned property may be vulnerable to confiscation, and previous
treaties are severed. 9 Domestically, the power of government to control
289. J. PELTASON, CORWIN & PELTASON'S UNDERSTANDING THE CONSTITUTION 85 (12th
ed. 1991).
290. Ancient authority asserts the legitimacy of drawing the sword to vindicate justice:
Let every soul be subject unto the higher powers. For there is no power but of
God: Whosoever therefore resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God: and
they that resist shall receive to themselves damnation. For rulers are not a terror
to good works, but to the evil. Wilt thou then not be afraid of the power? do that
which is good, and thou shalt have praise of the same: For he is the minister of
God to thee for good. But if thou do that which is evil, be afraid; for he beareth
not the sword in vain: for he is the minister of God, a revenger to execute wrath
upon him that doeth evil. Wherefore ye must needs be subject, not only for wrath,
but also for conscience sake.
Romans 13:1-5 (King James). Paul teaches that the sovereign is authorized ("Wherefore") to
enforce justice, but the minister of the state forfeits this ordinance if proceeding unjustly
("minister ...for good"). The Declaration of Independence correspondingly repudiated an
illegitimate rule, in the name of "the laws of nature and of nature's God." The Declaration of
Independence, para. 1 (U.S. 1776).
Presupposing human law illegitimate if not premised on the law of nature and of nature's God
was familiar to lawyers of the Revolutionary Era like Thomas Jefferson and John Adams. W.
BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND § 2, at 29 (1902).
291. Benjamin, Rhetoric and the Perfornative Act of Declaring War, 21 PRESIDENTIAL
STUDIES Q. 73, 76 (1991).
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private citizens and private enterprise is multiplied and the protections
guaranteed by the Constitution are practically suspended.' The
performativel congressional act of declaring war under Article I, in brief,
hands the government a vast, autocratic control of men and women.
Declaring war is no ritual formality but means a fundamental shift of
power.2
The declaration of war embodying a basic power shift, the equally proper
method of meeting crises with limited hostilities might be not unauthorized
presidential warfare but a Congressional resolution authorizing
warmaking25 (as did the Authorization for Use of Military Force against
Iraq Resolution of January 12). This, too, is a constitutional lesson of the
crisis of 1990-1991. It was affirmed in the legal literature immediately
pre-Operation Desert Shield.'
292. Id.
293. The import of declaring war runs far beyond that suggested by Secretary Acheson as
quoted in the text. Supra note 40. Modem literary criticism discerns a perforniative act in not
only "declaring" but even in reading. J. MILLER, VERSIONS OF PYGMALION 8, 21-22, & 240-43
(1990).
294. Benjamin, supra note 291, at 76.
295. The propriety of meeting crises with "limited" hostilities is exemplified when victory
can be pressed resolutely without need for mobilization so menacing domestic liberty as to be
unjustifiable without a declaration of war by Congress; here what is limited is the need for
mobilization (Grenada, Panama). This is not to assert the propriety of engaging in hostilities
"limited" to not victory but bloody stalemate; there what is limited is presidential honoring of
the mutual support partnership between the commander in chief and his troops (Korea,
Indochina).
[O]nce war is forced upon us, there is no other alternative than to apply every
available means to bring it to a swift end. War's very object is victory, not
prolonged indecision.
In war there is no substitute for victory....
MacArthur, Address by General MacArthur to a Joint Meeting of Congress, April 19, 1951, in
R. ROVERE & A. SCHLESINGER, JR., supra note 74, at 269, 275. In a subsection entitled
"Justice in Settlements" discussing the Korean War, M. WALzER, supra note 21, at 117-24,
Michael Walzer (with a chapter entitled "War's Ends, and the Importance of Winning," id. at
109) attacks the no substitute for victory maxim as "a silly idea, since it offers no definition of
victory." Id. at 122. But Walzer never reveals how that war actually was settled (nor even that
it was settled at all): President Eisenhower successfully threatened nuclear escalation. D.
EIsENHOwER, MANDATE FOR CHANGE 181 (1963). Former President Nixon likewise conceded
that Nixon should have ended the Indochina War in 1969 by undertaking his May and December
1972 bombing campaigns in early 1969. FROM: THE PRESIDENT 1 (B. Oudes ed. 1988), citing
Meet the Press, Apr. 10, 1988.
296. Swan, supra note 156, at 86-87 n. 184. Cf. M. GLENNON, supra note 5, at 77-78 and
116-117, citing Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. 37 (1800); Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. 1 (1801); Brown v.
United States, 12 U.S. 110 (1814); and J. STORY, 3 COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION §
1169 (1833).
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X. CONCLUSION
The preceding overview has discussed the 1990-1991 Iraq-Kuwait crisis
and found that President Bush most assertively enforced the resolutions of the
U.N. Security Council in rescuing Kuwait. The American part in that
military showdown was not necessitated by either the U.N. Charter or the
United Nations Participation Act. The U.S. role in the fighting was
nonetheless constitutional, at any rate as of January 1991. In the 1990
Dellwns case the federal judiciary had declined to curb the President's robust
military policies.
Delluns comports with the post-1936/1938 federal interbranch division of
labor. Thereunder the functions of an unchecked central government are
severally performed by the three unchecked branches thereof. This particular
mode of functionalism has facilitated the political economy program of the
federal government during the past half-century at the expense of the states.
The post-Operation Desert Storm musings of Profs. Glennon and Franck on
how to check a runaway foreign policymaking executive are futile, because
too nearly oblivious to the dynamics of the federal interbranch division of
labor.
Two books produced simultaneously with Operation Desert Shield throw
the Bush administration's postinvasion hostility to the threat constituted by
Saddam Hussein into a longer historical perspective. The index to the 726
pages of text comprising the memoirs of President Ronald Reagan,' in
whose administration George Bush served as Vice-President for the eight
years preceding January 20, 1989, does not even include Saddam Hussein,
although he ruled Iraq throughout President Reagan's tenure. Concededly,
President Reagan may not be an impressive "nuts and bolts" expert" 8 on
American military policy.
Yet the 1991 memoirs of former U.S. Senator John G. Tower, former
Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee and President Bush's
own 1989 nominee for the Secretaryship of Defense, are not dissimilar.
They relate Tower's intended strategy for the Bush Defense Department: "I
saw that the military would be able to absorb a reasonable reduction in
spending by cutting manpower, transferring some active-duty units to the
reserves and scaling back our presence in the Persian Gulf region. Should
the Soviets make good on their promises of troop and tank pullbacks from
297. R. REAGAN, AN AMERicAN LIFE (1990).
298. Memoirist Reagan quotes his diary entry of April 28, 1982, concerning his meeting
a group including "Howard Bohling," Id. at 318, a confusion of U.S. Rep. Richard Bolling and
White House Chief of Staff Howard Baker. Hertzberg, The Child Monarch, NEW REPUBUC,
Sept. 9, 1991, at 27, 32. Saddam Hussein was not important enough to merit a Reagan index
entry, although the phantom Howard Bohling was. R. REAGAN, supra note 297, at 729.
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Eastern Europe, I felt, additional savings could be made."'
The merits of redeeming oilrich Kuwait through Operation Desert Shield
and of unleashing Operation Desert Storm against Iraq (ancient
Mesopotamia') will come to be variously debated even by some of their
participants. So could be even the most popular of foreign conflicts. Wrote
one widely-hailed memoirist of another Western intervention into
intra-Middle Eastern conflict, Colonel Thomas Edward Lawrence of Arabia:
[W]hen we won, it was charged against me that the British petrol
royalties in Mesopotamia were becoming dubious, and French
Colonial policy ruined in the Levant. I am afraid that I hope so.
We pay for these things too much in honor and in innocent lives.
I went up the Tigris with one hundred Devon Territorials,
young, clean, delightful fellows, full of the power of happiness
and of making women and children glad. By them one saw
vividly how great it was to be their kin, and English. And we
were casting them by thousands into the fire to the worst of
deaths, not to win the war but that the corn and rice and oil of
Mesopotamia might be ours."°1
299. J. TOWER, CONSEQUENCES: A PERSONAL AND POLITICAL MEMOIR 225 (1991)
(emphasis supplied).
300.
The destiny of Iraq is inextricably bound up with mystical notions of Mesopota-
mian antiquity. The Greeks gave Iraq the name Mesopotamia, meaning the land
between the rivers. And indeed, the Tigris and Euphrates rivers form the core of
present-day Iraq. Baghdad lies on the Tigris, which flows southward from Turkey
to join the Euphrates, coming from Syria in the west.
J. MILLER & L. MYLROIE, supra note 20, at 58.
301. T. LAWRENCE, ORIENTAL ASSEMBLY 143-144 (A. Lawrence ed. 1940). This passage
was suppressed until years after the late Col. Lawrence's death. J. WILSON, LAWRENCE OF
ARABIA: THE AUTHORIZED BIOGRAPHY OF T.E. LAWRENCE 1026-27 n. 69 (1990). Despite this
language ("English"), Col. Lawrence was born in Wales, id. at 20, of an Anglo-Irish father, id.
at 941, and a Scottish mother. Id. at 31, 942.
I am Irish, . . . . It's not my fault, wholly, if I am not more Irish: family,
political, even money obstacles will hold me in England always. I wish it were
not so.
Id. at 896 (letter of Oct. 12, 1932, from T. E. Lawrence to William Butler Yeats).
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